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UNTANGLING THE WEB OF CONSIGNMENT LAW:
THE JOURNEY FROM THE COMMON LAW &
ARTICLE 2 TO REVISED ARTICLE 9
WILLA GIBSON*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines and analyzes the law of consignments
from the common law through Revised Article 9 with a goal towards
identifying and analyzing the uncertainties and confusion that have
persisted throughout the transition from the common law to the
UCC. The law of consignments has abounded with uncertainty since
its genesis under common law. In an attempt to clarify the persistent confusion and disarray surrounding the law, the UCC enacted
section 2-326; but the statute was not a model of clarity, engendering increased uncertainty and confusion. Courts wrestled with
how to interpret the provision to be consistent with the intent of the
UCC drafters. In 1999, the UCC moved consignments from Article
2 to Article 9 and made substantial revisions to both Articles to
provide greater clarity. While Article 9 provides a much more
comprehensive legal framework for consignments, in many respects
it is a reformulation of former Article 2-326. Thus, many of the
uncertainties concomitant with the Article 2 coverage of consignments continue to persist under Article 9. And the revisions to Article 9 have generated new issues on which courts are split, creating
even more confusion. In August 2017, the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code drafted a Commentary and
proposed certain amendments to resolve some of the uncertainties
surrounding the Article 9 revisions. The commentary and amendments provide much-needed clarity, but they leave unresolved several
* Willa Gibson is a Dean’s Club Professor of Law at the University of Akron
School of Law where she teaches Constitutional Law, Contracts, and Secured
Transactions. She was a former senior counsel and finance attorney in the
Enforcement Division of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Author wants to thank her research assistant, Ryan Robinson, for his hard
work on this project.
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significant issues in which uncertainty persists and on which courts
are split. The goal of this Article is to identify and analyze the various uncertainties that have arisen from the common law through
Revised Article 9 and to propose revisions that include removing
consignments from the definitional provision of Article 9 to its own
separate provision in Article 9 to resolve more extensively the persistent and burgeoning uncertainties identified throughout this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1979, one commentator discussing consignments stated
that “[f]ew widely used commercial devices have had so checkered
and volatile a legal history as the consignment. And few such devices have been able to survive so long and tortuous a legal history and yet retain so many elements of confusion and disarray.”1
Almost forty years later, the confusion and disarray surrounding
consignments persist. Once governed by common law, later by
Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and, currently, by
Revised Article 9 of the UCC, each iteration of consignment law has
presented the courts with a myriad of legal challenges all stemming from one central issue: Whether creditors of a consignee can
assert claims against consigned goods in the possession of their
debtor/consignee?2
Under the common law, consignee’s creditors could not assert
claims against consigned goods even though consignors were not
required to provide public notice of their consignment transactions.3 This was problematic for creditors of consignees, who often
provided funding under the mistaken belief that consignees’ possession of consigned goods signified their ownership of them.4 The
common law also presented various legal challenges as courts grappled with how to distinguish consignments from other types of
commercial transactions that shared similar characteristics.5
The decision to remove consignments from common law coverage to Article 2 was motivated by both a desire to provide greater
clarity and to remedy the concern that the consignee’s ostensible
ownership of consigned goods misled creditors who were unaware of
undisclosed consignment arrangements.6 Unlike the common law,
section 2-326 provided that a consignee’s creditors could assert
claims against consigned goods unless the consignor could prove
William D. Harrington, The Law of Consignments: Antitrust and Commercial Pitfalls, 34 BUS. LAW. 431, 431 (1979).
2 See infra Parts II–V.
3 John Hicinbothem, Consignments, Creditors’ Rights and U.C.C. Section
2-326, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 62, 62 (1967).
4 See id.
5 See infra note 26.
6 Hicinbothem, supra note 3, at 62–63.
1
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that one of the exceptions found in section 2-326(3) applied.7 Each
exception was premised on the idea that a consignee’s creditors
were either generally aware or had notice of the consignment
arrangement, thereby eliminating the concern regarding secret
liens.8 However, even after the enactment of UCC section 2-326,
the confusion and disarray surrounding consignments persisted.9
Section 2-326 engendered uncertainty presenting various problems for the courts, which split on how to judiciously interpret the
section to achieve the underlying goals of Article 2.10 In 1980,
two prominent commentators stated that, “[t]he Code’s handling
of consignments is fraught with uncertainty, and the Code cases
on the subject clear up little.”11
The decision to move consignments from Article 2 to Article 9 was prompted by a desire to provide greater clarity and to
resolve in an efficient and comprehensive manner the persistent
and ever burgeoning uncertainties that surrounded Article 2.12
The move to Article 9 came with substantial revisions to Articles
2 and 9 with an expectation for greater clarity, uniformity, and
predictability to the law of consignments.13 Specifically, the Article 9 revisions treat the law of consignments in a more comprehensive fashion.14 It has not succeeded, however, in resolving
7 U.C.C.

§ 2-326(3) (1957) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999).
§ 2-326 cmt. 2 (1999).
9 See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 1 (August 14, 2017) [hereinafter PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT].
10 Id. The Draft notes that “[b]efore the 1999 revision of Article 9 and its
attendant revision of § 2-326, many believed that ‘[t]he Uniform Commercial
Code’s provisions regarding consignments [were] not models of draftsmanship.’” Id.
11 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 22-4, at 883 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter WHITE
& SUMMERS, HANDBOOK].
12 See PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 1 (noting that “[t]he 1999
revision of Article 9 clarified these provisions, in most cases without changing
the rights of the creditors of the consignee”).
13 See id.
14 Under Article 9, consignments are classified as purchase money security
interests; and consignors are required to perfect their interests by filing a financing statement to protect their interest against judicial lien creditors. U.C.C.
§§ 9-103(d), 9-310(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). And to protect their interest against secured creditors, consignors must file a financing
8 Id.
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all of the uncertainties that were left unanswered by its predecessor.15 And the advent of the 1999 revisions engendered some
new issues about which courts and commentators are uncertain.16
In August 2017, the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) for the
UCC drafted proposed amendments to Articles 2 and 9’s Official
Comments to resolve some of the uncertainties which persist.17 The
Official Comments provide much-needed clarification but still leave
some of the issues presented in recent court opinions unresolved.18
The goal of this Article is to identify the various uncertainties that have arisen and their genesis, analyze the legal effect
of those uncertainties, and discuss how those uncertainties can
best be resolved to promote the underlying goals of Article 9. This
Article also highlights how the draft PEB proposed amendments
to Article 2 and 9’s Official Comments seek to resolve some of
the uncertainties. As part of the analysis, this Article provides an
in-depth look at the jurisprudence that has developed from the
common law through the 1999 UCC revisions.
Part I of the Article provides an overview of consignments.
Part II of the Article examines the common law treatment of
consignments. Part III examines pre-1999 UCC treatment of consignments, identifying and analyzing the areas of uncertainty involving competing claims to consigned goods. Part IV discusses the
1999 UCC consignment law revisions as they pertain to the rights
of consignors and consignee creditors and analyzes the uncertainties that have arisen concerning these parties’ rights. Part V
discusses judicial treatment of consignments under Revised Article 9 with a goal towards providing resolutions for the uncertainties created by the revision. The Conclusion states that a
comprehensive revision to Article 9 consignment law should be
considered that includes moving consignment coverage from the
definitional provision of Article 9 to its own separate provision to
resolve fully the uncertainties identified throughout this Article.
statement and comply with the inventory purchase money security interest
priority rule. Id. §§ 9-310(a), 9-324(b).
15 See PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 1.
16 See infra Part V.
17 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 6–7.
18 See infra Part V.
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I. OVERVIEW OF CONSIGNMENTS
A. Introduction
A true consignment transaction involves the entrusting or
delivery of goods by the owner, the consignor, to another party, the
consignee, with the understanding that the consignee will attempt
to sell the good on behalf of the consignor.19 Generally, owners use
consignments to avoid the risk associated with finding a market
for, and to maintain control over the pricing of, their goods.20 In a
“true consignment,” the consignor maintains control over the
pricing of the consigned good and retains title and ownership of
the good.21 The good is delivered to the consignee who is authorized to sell the good based on the consent of the consignor, and the
consignor establishes the price at which the consignee must sell
the good.22 Any time prior to sale of the good, the consignor can
demand return of it, and when the consignee does sell the good, the
consignee is paid a set commission by the consignor, rather than
receive a profit.23 The consignee must return the good if it is not
sold, and at no time is the consignee obligated to pay for the good.24
The operative word in the term true consignment is the term
true because, even though parties may title their agreement a
consignment, a court may conclude that the agreement is an entirely different type of commercial transaction such as an outright sale, sale or return, true bailment, or even a security interest
securing an obligation.25 Courts have long-wrestled with how to
distinguish true consignments from the other types of commercial
transactions that are facially similar to, but substantively different from, consignments.26 A court’s conclusion that an agreement
19 Excel Bank v. Nat’l Bank of Kansas City, 290 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2009).
20 Hicinbothem, supra note 3, at 64; see Underwriters at Lloyds v. Shimer
(In re Ide Jewelry Co., Inc.), 75 B.R. 969, 977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
21 United States v. Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d 287, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Excel Bank, 209 S.W.3d at 808.
22 Excel Bank, 209 S.W.3d at 808.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 807–08.
25 See id. at 805.
26 See In re Mississippi Valley Livestock, Inc., 745 F.3d 299, 302–04 (7th
Cir. 2014); Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 299–302 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Liebzeit v.
FVTS Acquisition Co. (In re Wolverine Fire Apparatus Co. of Sherwood Michigan),
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titled a consignment is in actuality an entirely different type of
commercial transaction may be a game changer concerning the
respective rights of the parties asserting competing interests in
the consigned goods.27
B. True Consignment
A true consignment creates a bailment agency relationship
with the consignor as the principal and the consignee as the agent.28
In Liebzeit v. FVTS Acquisition Co., the bankruptcy court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin defined a true consignment as:
[A] simple sales agency in which goods are delivered to a dealer
for resale purposes, and this device is used as a price-fixing arrangement whereby the consignor may direct that the consignee
charge a certain price for the goods. Both parties anticipate
that the goods will eventually be transferred to a third party,
and the consignor will be paid thereafter, usually with payment
reduced by the consignee’s fee.29

Consignments are considered a type of bailment (bailments
for the purpose of sale) because they, like bailments, involve the
entrusting or delivering of a thing to another person by an owner
who retains title and control over the thing the owner delivered.30
But true consignments satisfying the Article 9 statutory definition
are governed by the UCC while Article 9 does not apply to true
bailments.31 Notwithstanding the difference in legal treatment
465 B.R. 808, 818–21 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2012); Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Greenline
Equip., Inc. (In re Greenline Equip., Inc.), 390 B.R. 576, 579 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.
2008); JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., v. AVCO Corp. (In re Citation Corp.),
349 B.R. 290, 295–97 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2006); Underwriters at Lloyds v. Shimer
(In re Ide Jewelry Co., Inc.), 75 B.R. 969, 973–74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); Gen.
Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d 1240, 1244–
45 (Ala. 1983); In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL3489869, at
*4 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 2005); First Nat’l Bank of Blooming Prairie v. Olsen, 403
N.W.2d 661, 665–66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Italian Design Imp. Outlet v. New
York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 891 N.Y.S.2d 260, 265–66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
27 See, e.g., In re Mississippi Valley Livestock, 745 F.3d at 302–04; In re
Wolverine Fire Apparatus Co., 465 B.R. at 818–21.
28 Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 298.
29 In re Wolverine Fire Apparatus Co., 465 B.R. at 818.
30 Id.; see Excel Bank, 209 S.W.3d at 804.
31 The Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to transactions that are
purely bailments. In re Wolverine Fire Apparatus Co., 465 B.R. at 819.
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however, every consignment can be considered a type of bailment, but not every bailment is a consignment.32 The reason is
that, in a true bailment, the goods delivered by the bailor are the
same goods returned to the bailor once the purpose for which the
bailment was created has been fulfilled.33 While in a consignment, the consignor delivers the goods to the consignee for resale, and those goods are only returned to the consignor if the
consignee is unable to sell them.34 Even though goods are only
returned in a consignment if they are not sold, the United States
Supreme Court in as early as 1893 in Sturm v. Booker noted that
consignments were still a type of bailment stating that: “[t]he
agency to sell and return the proceeds, or the specific goods if
not sold, stands upon precisely the same footing [as a bailment],
and does not involve a change of title.”35
II. COMMON LAW TREATMENT OF CONSIGNMENTS
Under the common law, creditors of a consignee had no
claim against consigned goods in the possession of the consignee.36
Consignments were viewed as true bailments in which the title
to the consigned goods remained with the consignor creating an
agency relationship between the consignor and the consignee.37
32 Id.

at 818.
See In re Mississippi Valley Livestock, Inc., 745 F.3d 299, 302–03 (7th
Cir. 2014).
34 Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co., 231 U.S. 522, 530 (1913); JP Morgan
Chase Bank, N.A., v. AVCO Corp. (In re Citation Corp.), 349 B.R. 290, 296–
97 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2006) (finding that a bailment, not a consignment agreement, was executed by the parties highlighting that the owner did not authorize
the bailee to sell the good it had delivered); United States v. Nektalov, 440 F.
Supp. 2d 287, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784, 790
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003); see Fariba v. Dealer Servs. Corp., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d
219, 225–26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
35 Sturm v. Booker, 150 U.S. 312, 330 (1893) (alteration in original).
36 See Sturm, 150 U.S. at 330 (“An essential incident to trust property is
that the trustee or bailee can never make use of it for his own benefit. Nor
can it be subjected by his creditors to the payment of his debts.”); Ludvigh,
231 U.S. at 528; Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber
Co., 437 So. 2d 1240, 1244 (Ala. 1983) (noting that prior to the UCC “[i]f the
consignee had an absolute right to return unsold goods without any obligation to pay for them, the arrangement fell outside the requirement for chattel
mortgages and liens.”).
37 Ludvigh, 231 U.S. at 528.
33
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The consignment transaction was emphasized as a bailment with
a right of return of the good to the consignor.38 Since title to the
consigned goods remained with the consignor, consignee’s creditors had no claims to such goods, thus preventing them from securing an interest or attaching a lien to them.39 As such, consigned
goods were impervious to claims asserted by consignees’ creditors, even though the creditors had provided financing based on
their consignee/debtor’s apparent ownership of the goods.40
The common law treatment of consignments placed a consignee’s creditor in the unenviable position of having to forfeit its
perceived claim to consigned goods after having relied on a consignee’s possession of those goods in providing financing.41 In many
instances, creditors made loans secured by debtors’ inventory under the mistaken belief that a consignee’s possession of the consigned goods signified its ownership of them.42 The result was
particularly troublesome since the law did not require consignors to
record or provide any type of notice to prospective creditors of
their interests.43 Effectively, the undisclosed consignment agreements created secret liens on what appeared to the consignee’s
creditors as the consignee’s inventory.44 Consequently, consignee’s
creditors bore the risk of loss even though in many instances
they were not able to discover the consignment transaction.45
III. UCC ARTICLE 2 TREATMENT OF CONSIGNMENT LAW
A. Introduction
Former section 2-326 of the UCC was adopted to protect
creditors against hidden liens of consignors when consignees had
38 Id.

Excel Bank v. Nat’l Bank of Kansas City, 290 S.W.3d 801, 807–08 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2009).
40 See id. at 807.
41 Hicinbothem, supra note 3, at 62.
42 First Nat’l Bank of Blooming Prairie v. Olsen, 403 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987); Excel Bank, 209 S.W.3d at 807; see Hicinbothem, supra note 3, at
62–63.
43 Hicinbothem, supra note 3, at 62.
44 Excel Bank, 209 S.W.3d at 807.
45 See id.
39
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ostensible ownership of those goods.46 Under former section 2326, goods delivered primarily for resale would be classified as a
“sale or return” transaction if the goods were delivered for sale and
the person to whom they were delivered maintained “a place of
business at which he deals in goods of the kind involved, under a
name other than the name of the person making delivery.”47 While
such goods were in the buyer’s possession, they would be subject to
the claims of the buyer’s creditors.48 Section 2-326 deemphasized
the consignor’s reservation of the title as the hallmark for protecting consigned goods from the reach of the consignee’s creditors by providing instead that “[t]he provisions of this subsection
are applicable even though an agreement purports to reserve title
to the person making delivery until payment or resale or uses such
words as ‘on consignment.’”49 Subjecting the consigned goods to
the claims of the consignee’s creditors effectively shifted the risk of
loss from consignees’ creditors to the consignor, reversing the
common law result that placed the risk of loss with the consignee’s creditors.50
Section 2-326(3) did provide, however, that a consignor could
avoid claims of consignee’s creditors if the consignor proved: (a)
the consignor had complied with an applicable sign law; (b) it was
generally known by the consignee’s creditors that the consignee
was substantially engaged in selling the goods of others; or (c)
French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey Creations, LLC (In re Downey
Creations, LLC), 414 B.R. 463, 469–70 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009); Quaker City Iron
Works, Inc. v. Ganz (In re Wicaco Mach. Corp.), 49 B.R. 340, 343 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1984); Excel Bank, 209 S.W.3d at 807.
47 U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended
1999). A merchant was viewed as operating under a name other than the deliverer’s name provided that the consignee did not “so completely identify his business
with that of the consignor ‘that potential creditors would necessarily assume
that the business was that of the consignor solely.’” In re Wicaco Mach. Corp.,
49 B.R. at 343.
48 U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1999); see Underwriters at Lloyds v. Shimer (In re Ide
Jewelry Co., Inc.), 75 B.R. 969, 974 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that the goods
must be in the “buyer’s possession at the time the buyer’s creditor assert their
claims, in order for those goods to be subject to their claims” under section 2-326).
49 U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1999); see GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd. v. Kress-Dobkin
Co., 474 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
50 Eurpac Serv. Inc. v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 37 P.3d 447, 450 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2000).
46
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the consignor had complied with section 9-114.51 The underlying
premise of each exception was that notice had been given to a consignee’s creditors that the consigned goods were not owned by
the consignee, thereby eliminating any concern regarding undisclosed consignment arrangements.52
Courts interpreted section 2-326(3) as placing the burden
of proof on the consignor to establish that it had satisfied one of
the exceptions to avoid claims of a consignee’s creditors.53 In order
to avoid consignees’ creditors’ claims, consignors alleged frequently
that creditors’ claims were precluded by one of the three exceptions in section 2-326(3) or that Article 2 did not apply to the
consignment because it did not qualify as a “sale or return.”54
Much confusion existed surrounding how to determine whether
an exception applied and what rendered a consignment a “sale
or return.”55 It became apparent that Article 2’s coverage of consignments was “fraught with uncertainty,”56 as the courts grappled specifically with two distinctive issues: (1) Whether certain
2-326(3) exceptions applied and (2) Whether the consignment transaction was a “sale or return,” or a consignment intended as a
security interest governed by Article 9, rather than Article 2.57
B. Section 2-326(3) Exceptions
1. “Generally Known by Creditors” Exception
The most commonly proffered exception asserted by consignors was section 2-326(3)(b), which provided that a consignor
U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1999); see GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. at
1362 (noting the three exceptions of § 2-326(3)); Eurpac Serv. Inc., 37 P.3d at
450 (noting that “[t]his shifting of risks to the consignor is not complete, however,
as § 2-326(3) provides three exceptions.”).
52 Heller Fin., Inc. v. Samuel Schick, Inc. (In re Wedlo Holdings, Inc.), 248
B.R. 336, 341 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
53 Quaker City Iron Works, Inc. v. Ganz (In re Wicaco Mach. Corp.), 49
B.R. 340, 343–44 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re BRI Corp., 88 B.R. 71, 74 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1988); see Belmont Int’l, Inc. v. American Int’l Shoe Co., 831 P.2d 15,
18 (Or. 1992).
54 See, e.g., In re Wicaco Mach. Corp., 49 B.R. at 342–44.
55 Id.
56 Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d
1240, 1244 (Ala. 1983) (quoting WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK, supra note
11, § 22-4 at 883).
57 See, e.g., In re Wicaco Mach. Corp., 49 B.R. at 342–44.
51
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could avoid a consignee’s creditors’ claims if it could prove that
the creditors of the consignee generally knew that the consignee
was substantially engaged in selling the goods of others.58 How
best to interpret this exception caused a split in the courts, fueling uncertainty concerning the level of proof necessary to satisfy
section 2-326(3)(b).59 The most contentious issue surrounding
the “generally known” exception was whether a consignor met
its burden of proof by merely establishing that the creditor competing against it had actual knowledge of the consignee’s practices.60 If the purpose of section 2-326 was to protect creditors
which had been misled by secret liens, did a creditor with actual
knowledge of the consignment have any justifiable legal basis under
section 2-326 to assert its claim against the consigned goods?61
Courts that ruled a consignor met its burden of proof by
establishing that the competing creditor has actual knowledge
justified their rulings by emphasizing the UCC policy underlying
the adoption of section 2-326.62 They stressed that section 2-326
was adopted to protect only those creditors that had provided funding under a mistaken belief that their debtor owned the consigned
goods in its possession.63 If a creditor knew about the consignment arrangement it had no need of protection.64 In GBS Meat
U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(b) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended
1999); see GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd. v. Kress-Dobkin Co., 474 F. Supp. 1357,
1362–63 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Eurpac Serv. Inc. v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 37
P.3d 447, 450–51 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000); First Nat’l Bank of Blooming Prairie
v. Olsen, 403 N.W.2d 661, 665 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Belmont Int’l, Inc., 831
P.2d at 19.
59 See, e.g., Eurpac Serv. Inc., 37 P.3d at 450–51. But see, e.g., In re Wicaco
Mach. Corp., 49 B.R. at 343–44.
60 GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. at 1362–63; Eurpac Serv. Inc.,
37 P.3d at 450–51; First Nat’l Bank of Blooming Prairie, 403 N.W.2d at 665;
Belmont Int’l, Inc., 831 P.2d at 19.
61 Eurpac Serv. Inc., 37 P.3d at 450–51; First Nat’l Bank of Blooming Prairie,
403 N.W.2d at 665; Belmont Int’l, 831 P.2d at 19.
62 GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. at 1362–63; Eurpac Serv. Inc.,
37 P.3d at 450–51; First Nat’l Bank of Blooming Prairie, 403 N.W.2d at 665;
Belmont Int’l, 831 P.2d at 19.
63 GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. at 1362–63; In re Gross Mfg. &
Importing Co., 328 F. Supp. 905, 905 (D.N.J. 1971).
64 GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. at 1362–63; First Nat’l Bank of
Blooming Prairie, 403 N.W.2d at 665.
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Industry Pty. Ltd. v. Kress-Dobkin Co. the federal district court in
the Western District of Pennsylvania stated the following:
The clear import of the comments to § 2-326, and the judicial
precedents discussed above establish that, where a secured creditor knows that the proceeds [from the sale of consigned goods]
rightfully belong to a consignor, the consignor must have priority. Any other construction of § 2-326 would contravene the
intent of that section and would sanction intentional conversions of [consigned] goods or proceeds.65

In Belmont International v. American International Shoe
Company, the Supreme Court of Oregon criticized those courts
that required consignors to prove that most creditors had knowledge
of the consignee’s business practice stating that those courts
placed too much emphasis on the “s” in “creditors.”66 And in Eurpac
v. Republic, the Colorado Court of Appeals stated that it was
absurd to interpret section 2-326 as not holding a creditor responsible if it had actual knowledge, since the provision imputes
knowledge to unknowing creditors if such knowledge could reasonably have been obtained since it was generally known by a consignee’s creditors.67 The court stressed that such a result would
give greater weight to imputed knowledge than to actual knowledge
of a consignee’s practices.68
Other courts rejected, however, the contention that the “generally known” exception was satisfied if a consignor proved only that
the competing creditor had actual knowledge of the consignee’s
business practices.69 These courts held that the consignor was required to prove that the consignee’s practices were generally known
GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. at 1363; see ATG Aerospace,
Inc. v. High-Line Aviation Ltd. (In re High-Line Aviation, Inc.), 149 B.R. 730,
737 (Bankr. N.D. Ga 1992) (finding that actual knowledge of the creditor satisfied
the exception, reasoning that the section 1-102 of the UCC allows the Code
provisions to be construed liberally to promote its underlying purposes).
66 Belmont Int’l, 831 P.2d at 19.
67 Eurpac Serv. Inc. v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 37 P.3d 447, 451.
68 Id.
69 In re BRI Corp., 88 B.R. 71, 75 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (finding that evidence of 250 out of 600 suppliers knew the consignee was substantially engaged in
the business of selling goods of other was not sufficient to satisfy the “generally
known” standard noting that the number may indicate that some, but not most,
of the creditors knew).
65
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by a majority of its creditors.70 Majority means most, not some; yet
judicial precedent never has established a requisite percentage
as the percentage necessary to constitute a majority.71 However,
one consistent judicial approach has been that the “majority” requirement is determined by looking to the number of creditors
that have knowledge, not to the amount of claims.72 Also, courts
have not allowed a consignor to include inside-creditors of the
consignee as part of the majority, holding that such parties are
expected to know.73 The appropriate inquiry is what percentage
of outside creditors know of the consignee’s practices.74
The “generally known” exception also required that the consignor prove that the consignee’s creditors knew that the consignee was substantially engaged in selling the goods of others.75
Judicial precedent did not establish what percentage of the debtor’s
business had to be consignment sales to satisfy the “substantially
engaged” standard, but at least one court found that ten percent
was not sufficient to satisfy the standard.76
2. “Sign Law” Exception
Section 2-326(3)(a) provided that consignors could avoid
claims of consignee’s creditors if they “complie[d] with an applicable
law providing for a consignor’s interest or the like to be evidenced
by a sign.”77 Under the sign law, consignors could avoid claims of
competing creditors if the consignee posted a sign on its premise
Steege v. Affiliated Bank/North Shore Nat’l (In re Alper-Richman Furs,
Ltd.), 147 B.R. 140, 150 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); In re BRI Corp., 88 B.R. at 75;
Quaker City Iron Works, Inc. v. Ganz (In re Wicaco Mach. Corp.), 49 B.R. 340,
344 (E.D. Pa 1984).
71 In re BRI Corp., 88 B.R. at 75.
72 In re Wicaco Mach. Corp., 49 B.R. at 344 (holding that one-fifth of creditors knowing about the consignee’s practices was not sufficient to satisfy the
“generally known” standard even though the 1/5 held “sixty-three percent of
the claims against the debtor”).
73 In re Alper-Richman Furs, Ltd., 147 B.R. at 149–50.
74 Id. at 150.
75 ATG Aerospace, Inc. v. High-Line Aviation Ltd. (In re High-Line Aviation,
Inc.), 149 B.R. 730, 738 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992).
76 Id.
77 U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(a) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
amended 1999).
70
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notifying parties it was selling consigned goods.78 However, the
sign law provision was not available in those jurisdictions that
did not have sign laws.79
3. “Compliance with Section 9-114” Exception
Section 2-326(3)(c) was another exception that garnered
some confusion that created uncertainty. It provided that a consignor could avoid the claims of consignee’s creditors if it complied
with former section 9-114.80 And section 9-114 provided that a
consignor would have priority over a perfected secured party, if
the consignor had filed a financing statement before the consignee
took possession of the goods and had sent notification of its consignment to the competing secured party before the consignee received possession.81 Section 9-114 mirrored the former Article 9
priority rule for purchase money security interests, thereby effectively treating the consignor as a purchase money secured party,
which could prevail against conflicting security interests in the consigned goods by satisfying the same requirements a purchase
money secured party had to satisfy to have priority in inventory.82
The confusion surrounding the application of section 9-114
involved the language of the provision. Section 9-114(1) provided
that a consignor would have priority over competing perfected
creditors if section 2-326(3) required it to file under Article 9, and if
it complied with section 9-114 filing and notice requirements.83
Courts questioned whether the priority language in section 9-114
78 Barber v. McCord Auto Supply, Inc. (In re Pearson Indus. Inc.), 47 B.R.
914, 928 (S.D. Ill. 1992).
79 Id.
80 U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(c) (1999); Steege v. Affiliated Bank/North Shore Nat’l
(In re Alper-Richman Furs, Ltd.), 147 B.R. 140, 149 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992);
Multibank Nat’l of W. Mass. v. State St. Auto Sales, Inc. (In re State St. Auto
Sales, Inc.), 81 B.R. 215, 217 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988); see also In re High-Line
Aviation, Inc., 149 B.R. at 738.
81 U.C.C. § 9-114 (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended
1999). § 9-114 also provided the consignor priority in cash proceeds generated
from the disposition of the consigned goods provided the cash was received on
or before delivery of the goods to the buyer. Id.
82 Id. § 9-312(3); In re State St. Auto Sales, Inc., 81 B.R. at 217 (noting
that, “the section parallels the filing requirements governing purchase money
secured lenders under [former Article 9] § 9-312(3)”).
83 U.C.C. § 9-114 (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999).
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had removed the priority question from Article 2, placing it instead within the scope of Article 9, effectively vitiating the other
section 2-326(3) exceptions.84 Despite the confusion, courts and
commentators held that the most feasible interpretation of section 9-114 was to restrict its application to situations where filing a financing statement was the only effective method for a
consignor to assert priority over competing creditors.85
C. “Sale or Return” v. “Consignment Intended as Security”
Another area of confusion regarding consignments with
which courts struggled was whether the consignment agreement
was a “sale or return” or a “consignment intended as security.”86
Former section 1-201(b)(37) provided that the reservation of title
by a consignor was not a security interest in consigned good unless
the consignment was intended as security.87 And section 9102(2) stated that Article 9 governed “security interest created
by contract including ... consignment intended as security.”88
Consequently, if the consigned goods were intended as security
Article 9, rather than Article 2, would apply.89 The jurisprudential confusion centered on how to determine whether a consignment was a “sale or return,” rather than a “consignment intended
as security.”90
In re Alper-Richman Furs, Ltd., 147 B.R. at 149–50 (holding that the
section 9-114 exception only applies if neither of the other two 2-326 exceptions do not apply); BFC Chems., Inc. v. Smith-Douglass, Inc., 46 B.R. 1009,
1019–20 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
85 BFC Chems., Inc., 46 B.R. at 1019–20; In re State St. Auto Sales, Inc., 81
B.R. at 218.
86 Hicinbothem, supra note 3, at 63–66; see Barber v. McCord Auto Supply,
Inc. (In re Pearson Indus., Inc.), 47 B.R. 914, 927 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992) (noting
that “[t]he problem of whether a particular transaction is a ‘sale or return’ or
a ‘consignment’ transaction in which the seller retained title is one that has
plagued the courts for years. The problem has been complicated by the fact
that some sellers have drawn deliberately ambiguous agreements.”).
87 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(37) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
amended 1999).
88 Id. § 9-102(2) (1999).
89 Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So.
2d 1240, 1244 (Ala. 1983).
90 Hicinbothem, supra note 3, at 63–66.
84
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Courts formulated various tests to ascertain whether a
consignment was a “sale or return” rather than a “consignment
intended as security.”91 The most predominant tests involved
examining the facts and circumstances surrounding the transactions to construe the parties intentions with a goal towards ascertaining if the transaction involved an agency relationship
traditionally associated with consignments or an outright sale
on a secured basis.92 Some courts found that a consignment was
really a security interest securing an obligation if the consignee
was obligated to purchase the goods if it could not resell them.93
These courts reasoned that a true consignment consists of an
agency relationship with the consignor—the principal—at all
times retaining control of the consigned goods.94 Conversely, if
the consignee was required to purchase the item, it became the
owner to whom title was transferred.95 As such, the consignor’s
interest in the consigned goods was at best relegated to that of an
enforceable security interest, provided it had complied with the
attachment provisions of Article 9.96 Thus, Article 9, not Article
2, governed such transactions.97
Other courts applied an all-inclusive approach by analyzing the economic realities of the transactions to determine the
intent of the consignment parties.98 Intent was determined by an
objective standard that assessed the economic realities of the transaction by analyzing who retained control of the consigned goods,
whether the goods were commingled with goods owned by the
consignee, and which party set the price for the consigned goods.99
91 Id.
92 Id.;

see Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d at 1244.
v. Caldwell (In re Phippens), 4 B.R. 155, 158–59 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1980).
94 Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d at 1244.
95 Id. (concluding that that the consignment agreement was “intended as a
security interest” noting that the agreement provided that each shipment of
consigned goods was described as a “purchase agreement”).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Underwriters at Lloyds v. Shimer (In re Ide Jewelry Co.), 75 B.R. 969,
977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
99 Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d at 1244–45; In re Ide
Jewelry Co., 75 B.R. at 977.
93 Edmonson
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Courts also focused on the economic function of the consignment.100
Factors supporting the existence of a true consignment included:
(1) the consignor retaining control of the price at which the consigned goods were sold; (2) the consignor retaining the right to
recall the goods; (3) the consignee only having the authority to
sell consigned goods upon the express consent of the consignor;
(4) the consignee’s payment being in the form of a commission
rather than a profit; and (5) the storing of the consigned goods
separate from the consignee’s inventory.101 In contrast, factors supporting the existence of a consignment as a security interest
involved the consignee: (1) having the right to set the price of the
consigned good; (2) commingling the proceeds generated from
the sale of consigned goods with proceeds from the sale of its own
inventory; and (3) mixing the consigned goods with its own inventory; and it involved the consignor: (1) billing the consignee for
the goods once the goods were shipped to the consignee and (2) purporting to retain a security interest in the consigned goods.102
In GECC v. Strickland Division of Rebel Lumber Company,
the Supreme Court of Alabama used the all-inclusive approach
in concluding that a purported consignment was really a consignment intended as a security interest after reviewing the consignment agreement, which the court stated contained certain indicia
that supported its finding.103 The agreement provided that the consignee “was allowed to keep whatever profit he was able to charge
over the wholesale price and he was absolutely obligated to pay
[the consignor] a 5% upcharge even if he was unable to sell the
[consigned goods].”104 The agreement also described each shipment as a “purchase agreement.”105 The court concluded that the
consignee was not acting as an agent of the consignor, “but, to
the contrary, [the indicia] supported a finding that ... the consignment agreement was the functional equivalent” of a floor
plan arrangement.106
Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d at 1244–45; In re Ide
Jewelry Co., 75 B.R. at 978.
101 In re Ide Jewelry Co., 75 B.R. at 969, 978.
102 Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d at 1244–45; In re Ide
Jewelry Co., 75 B.R. at 978.
103 Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d at 1244–45.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
100
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IV. UCC REVISED ARTICLE 9 TREATMENT OF CONSIGNMENT LAW
A. Introduction
In response to persistent criticism that section 2-326 was
not a model of clarity, in 1999, the UCC revised Articles 1, 2, and 9
with a goal towards providing greater clarity and uniformity to
the law of consignments.107 The 1999 revisions sought to clarify
section 2-326 “in most cases without changing the rights of the
creditors of the consignee.”108 The UCC removed commercial consignments from section 2-326, placing them instead within the
scope of Article 9, provided they satisfied the Article 9 consignment definition found in section 9-102(a)(20).109 Comment 4 to
Revised Article 2-326 provides that, “[c]ertain true consignments
were dealt with in former sections 2-326(3) and 9-114. These
provisions have been deleted and have been replaced by new
provisions in Article 9.”110
Section 9-102 (a) (2) provides a comprehensive definition
for consignments that incorporates much of the former section 2326 provisions.111 The section defines an Article 9 consignment
as “a transaction ... in which a person delivers goods to a merchant for the purpose of sale” and:
(A) The merchant:
(1) Deals in goods of that kind under a name other than
the name of the person making delivery;
(2) Is not an auctioneer; and
(3) Is not generally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others;
(B) With respect to each delivery, the aggregate value of the
goods is $1,000 or more at the time of delivery;

107 PEB

COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 1.

108 Id.

In re Haley & Steele, No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869, at *4 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. 2005); see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW
§ 22-4 at 1166 (6th ed. 2010) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW]
(stating that “the combination of 9-102(a)(20) and 1-201(b)(35) has moved almost
all commercial consignments into Article 9—at least for most purposes.”); see
also Excel Bank v. Nat’l Bank of Kansas City, 290 S.W.3d 801, 804–05 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2009).
110 U.C.C. § 2-326 cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
111 Excel Bank, 290 S.W.3d at 805.
109
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(C) The goods are not consumer goods immediately before delivery; and
(D) The transaction does not create a security interest that secures an obligation.112

Like former section 2-326, revised section 9-102(a)(20)
was adopted to protect creditors from hidden liens resulting
from undisclosed consignment agreements.113 Official Comment
2 to section 9-319 states that, “[i]nsofar as creditors of the consignee are concerned, this Article to a considerable extent reformulates the former law, which appeared in former sections 2-326
and 9-114, without changing the results.”114 For example, section 9-102(a)(20)(A)(i) mirrors the former 2-326(3) provision that
required that the consignee to which the goods are delivered
deal in goods of that kind in a name other than the consignor.115
And section 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) mirrors the “generally known by
creditors” requirement in former section 2-326(3)(b).116
However, two primary distinctions exist between former
2-326 and current 9-102(a)(20). Former section 2-326 protected
consignors against consignee creditor claims if the state had a
sign law and the consignee posted a sign notifying parties of its
consignment practices, or if the consignor complied with section
9-114.117 But section 9-102(a)(20) does not provide for such protections; instead, it requires the consigner to file a financing statement to be shielded from claims of a consignee’s creditors.118
Section 9-102(a)(20) also differs from former section 2-326 with
112 U.C.C.

§ 9-102(a)(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
Excel Bank, 290 S.W.3d at 807; French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey
Creations, LLC (In re Downey Creations, LLC), 414 B.R. 463, 469 (Bankr. S.D.
Ind. 2009).
114 U.C.C. § 9-319 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
115 Id. § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(i).
116 Id. § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii); see Excel Bank, 290 S.W.3d at 806.
117 U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(a) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended
1999); see Excel Bank, 290 S.W.3d at 807 (noting that “[t]he primary difference after the 1999 revisions is that consignors may no longer rely on notice
through the posting of signs and/or written notifications to other creditors,
see former §§ 2-326(3) & 9-114, and they must now file a financing statement
to protect their interests, see §§§ 9-103(d), 9-310, & 9-311.”)
118 See Excel Bank, 290 S.W.3d at 807 (noting that “drafters of the UCC ...
chose to remove the additional provisions that allowed consignors to protect
their interests through actual and constructive notice and, instead, required
them to file a UCC financing statement to protect their interest”).
113
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its addition of subsections B and C, both of which statutorily
“exclude transactions for which filing would be inappropriate or
of insufficient benefit to justify the costs.”119 And another difference is that section 9-102(a)(20)(D) specifically provides that
consignments “intended as security interest” are not Article 9
consignments.120
B. Article 9 Consignments
1. Consignors’ Interests in Consigned Goods
Consignors whose consignment agreements qualify as Article 9 consignments under 9-102(a)(20) must comply with Article 9
perfection and priority rules to prevail against competing secured
parties that are creditors of the consignee.121 Section 1-201(b)(35)
facilitates a consignor’s compliance with Article 9 by providing
that a consignor’s interest in consigned goods is a security interest;
however, the security interest designation does not change the
relationship between the consignor and consignee.122 And section
9-103(d) provides that the security interest is a purchase money
security interest.123 A consignor can best protect its interest by
filing a financing statement to perfect its interest.124 And whether it
files a financing statement dictates its rights vis-à-vis the consignee’s creditors.125
119 Id.

at 805.
§ 9-102(a)(20)(D) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
121 Georgetown Steel Co. v. Progress Rail Serv. Corp. (In re Georgetown
Steel Co.), 318 B.R. 352, 356 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2004) (noting that “most of the
law concerning consignment transactions was governed by Article 2,” but that
after the revisions, Article 9 provisions govern most consignments).
122 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see IPC
(USA), Inc. v. Ellis (In re Pettit Oil Co.), 575 B.R. 905, 911 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2017); In re Georgetown Steel Co., 318 B.R. at 356.
123 U.C.C. § 9-103(d) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see also
In re Pettit Oil Co., 575 B.R. at 907; Arthur Glick Truck Sales, Inc. v.
Stuphen E. Corp., 914 F. Supp. 2d 529, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
124 Arthur Glick Truck Sales, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 541; TSA Stores, Inc. v. M
J Soffe, LLC (In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc.), 565 B.R. 292, 298–99 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2017).
125 In re Pettit Oil Co., 575 B.R. at 911; Arthur Glick Truck Sales, 914 F.
Supp. 2d at 541.
120 U.C.C.
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a. The Legal Status of an Unperfected Consignor
If a consignor does not perfect its security interest, section
9-319(a), which was adopted as part of the 1999 revisions, provides
that that consignee is deemed to have the rights and title of the
consignor “for purposes of determining the rights of creditors of,
and purchasers for value of goods from, a consignee.”126 Even
though as between the consignor and consignee the consignor remains the owner of the goods, section 9-319(a) grants the consignee
the rights and title of the consignor to transfer interests in the goods
to its creditors.127 Section 9-319(a) grants those rights to the consignee’ creditors to protect them from “undisclosed consignment
arrangements with the consignee that create secret liens.”128
Effectively, section 9-319(a) creates a legal fiction that enables the consignee’s creditors such as secured parties and judicial lien creditors to attach their interests to the consigned goods
as if the consignee possessed title to the goods.129 The consignee
acquires those rights even though as between the consignor and
consignee, the consignee only has limited rights.130 Consequently,
U.C.C. § 9-319(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM’N 2017). Official Comment 2 to 9-319(a) explicitly indicates that the consignee has such rights if
the consignor is unperfected. Id. at cmt. 2; see also In re Pettit Oil Co., 575 B.R. at
910; Arthur Glick Truck Sales, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 542 (holding that once the consignment transaction is executed, the consignee is deemed to have the rights
and title of the consignor for purposes of determining the rights of its creditors unless the consignor has filed a financing statement perfecting its security interest).
127 Official Comment 2 provides that the consignee acquires the rights and
title of the consignor “even though, as between the parties, [consignor and
consignee], it purchases a limited interest in the goods (as would be the case
in a true consignment, under which the consignee acquires only the interest
of a bailee).” U.C.C. § 9-319 cmt. 2.
128 In re Pettit Oil Co., 575 B.R. at 910.
129 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). The
Official Comment 6 to section 9-203 provides that “[a] debtor’s limited rights
in collateral, short of full ownership, are sufficient for a security interest to
attach.” Id. § 9-203 cmt. 6; see In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 123 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2002) (stating that “[t]his fiction allows the consignee’s creditors to attach
the consigned goods as if the consignee actually had title to the goods”); Auto.
Fin. Corp. v. Cornejo, No. DO44553, 2005 WL 1349904, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 8, 2005).
130 Cornejo, 2005 WL 1349904, at *4; Fariba v. Dealer Servs. Corp., 100
Cal. Rptr. 3d 219, 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
126
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the consignee’s creditors can attach judicial liens and security
interests to consigned goods “while the goods are in the possession of the consignee.”131
One question that has arisen concerning section 9-319 is
whether the termination of a consignment agreement “insulates
the consigned goods from the reach of the consignee’s creditors if
the consignor’s interest is unperfected.”132 The answer depends
on whether the consignee created a security interest in, or a lien
attached to the consigned goods before the goods were returned
to the consignor.133 In In re Valley Media, the bankruptcy court
for the District of Delaware found that where the consignment
agreements were terminated prepetition, the debtor-in-possession
did not have any rights to exercise its powers under section 544
(a) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code.134 In response to In re Valley Media,
the PEB Commentary proposed draft provides the following:
The termination of a consignment agreement does not ipso facto
cause a “consignee” to lose its status as such, nor does it insulate
the consigned goods from the reach of the consignee’s creditors if
the consignor’s interest is unperfected. The suggestion to the
contrary in In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105 (Bankr. D. Del.
2002), is incorrect.135

The proposed commentary clarifies that “[a]fter the [consigned] goods have been returned to the consignor, the consignee
loses all rights to the goods and so no longer can encumber them
by creating a security interest. Nor can the consignee’s creditors
acquire a judicial lien on the goods after that time.” 136 However,
the proposal emphasizes that creditors whose interests attach to
consigned goods while they are in the possession of the consignee
remain enforceable even after the goods have been returned to
the consignor, even though the consignee no longer possesses the
goods and no longer has the rights and title of the consignor. 137
131 Fariba,

100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 226.
COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 5 n.35.
133 Id. at 5–6.
134 In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. at 142–43.
135 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 5 n.35.
136 Id. at 5–6.
137 Id. at 6.
132 PEB
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The PEB proposes amending Official Comment 2 to 9-319 to include the following:
The termination of a consignment agreement does not ipso facto
cause the consignee to lose its status as such, nor does it deprive the consignee of the deemed rights and title provided by
subsection (a). Return of the goods to the consignor causes the
consignee to lose its deemed rights and title, but it does not discharge a security interest or judicial lien that attached while
the consignee was in possession.138

b. The Legal Status of a Perfected Consignor
Section 9-319(b) provides that law other than Article 9
“determines the rights and title of a consignee” if the consignor
has perfected its security interest and has priority under Article
9.139 Most likely, the common law of bailment will govern the rights
and titles of the consignee; and it would preclude consignee’s
creditors from asserting claims against the consigned goods.140
To best protect its interest, a consignor must perfect its interest
by filing a financing statement before the delivery of the consigned goods to the consignee.141 In Arthur Glick Truck Sales, the
federal district court for the Southern District of New York stated
that a subsequent filing by the consignor after the execution of the
consignment agreement did not prevent the consignee from transferring the consignor’s rights and title to the consignee’s creditors.142 Even though the consignor subsequently filed a financing
statement, the court emphasized that at the time of delivery of
the consigned goods, the consignor’s purchase money security interest was unperfected thereby triggering the operation of 9-319(a).143
If a consignor timely files its financing statement, it will
have priority over the consignee’s secured creditors if it complies
with the applicable Article 9 priority rules.144 To assert priority
138 Id.

at 7.
§ 9-319(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
140 Id. Section 9-319(b) also defers to the common law of bailment or other
state law governing consignments.
141 TSA Stores, Inc. v. M J Soffe, LLC (In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc.), 565
B.R. 292, 298–99 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017).
142 Arthur Glick Truck Sales, Inc. v. Stuphen E. Corp., 914 F. Supp. 2d 529,
542 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 541.
139 U.C.C.
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against a competing secured creditor of the consignee, the consignor
must comply with section 9-324(b), which requires that the consignor’s security interest be perfected and that the consignee’s
creditor receive notice of the consignor’s interest before the consignee takes possession of the consigned goods.145 If the consignor
complies with section 9-324(b), it will not only have priority in
the consigned goods, but also in any identifiable cash proceeds
received by the consignee on or before delivery of the consigned
goods to a buyer, along with priority in certain noncash proceeds
generated from the sale of the goods.146
The consignor’s perfected status will also grant it priority
over judicial lien creditors since section 9-317(a)(1) provides that
a perfected party has priority over a lien creditor.147
2. Consignee’s Secured Creditors’ Interests in Consigned Goods
a. Introduction
A secured creditor’s interest in consigned goods of its
debtor/consignee will be governed by Article 9 if the consignor
has not perfected its security interest nor established priority under
Article 9.148 But to prevail against a consignor, a secured creditor
of the consignee must have a perfected security interest in the
consigned good, which requires the creditor to attach and to perfect its security interest.149
b. Attachment of Consigned Goods by a Consignee’s
Secured Creditors
A consignee’s creditor must attach its security interest to
consigned goods pursuant to section 9-203 to obtain an enforceable
U.C.C. § 9-324(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see Liebzeit
v. FVTS Acquisition Co. (In re Wolverine Fire Apparatus Co.), 465 B.R. 808,
820 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2012).
146 U.C.C. § 9-324(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
147 Id. § 9-317(a); see Kraken Invs. Ltd. v. Jacobs (In re Salander-O’Reilly
Galleries, LLC), 506 B.R. 600, 608 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, No. 14CV3544(VB),
2014 WL 7389901, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014).
148 IPC (USA), Inc. v. Ellis (In re Pettit Oil Co.), 575 B.R. 905, 907 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2017); In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC, 506 B.R. at 605.
149 U.C.C. § 9-309 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
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security interest in them.150 Section 9-203 requires, among other
things, that the debtor have rights in the collateral or power
transfer rights and that the security agreement sufficiently describe the collateral securing the obligation.151 The section 9203(b)(2) “power to transfer” element of attachment is satisfied
by section 9-319(a), which grants the consignee the power to
transfer the rights and title of the consigned goods to its secured
creditors while those goods are in its possession.152
However, an issue has arisen whether section 9-319(a) is
more than “merely an enabling provision that permits satisfaction
of [section 9-203(b)(2)].”153 Specifically, can a consignee pursuant
to section 9-319(a) grant a security interest in consigned goods
even if the security agreement limits the collateral description to
property owned by the debtor? Under section 9-203(b)(3)(A), a secured creditor can only attach its security interest to goods covered by the collateral description in the security agreement.154 That
provision arguably limits the consignee from granting a security
interest in consigned goods if the security agreement between it
and its secured creditor describe the collateral as only that property owned by the debtor, since the debtor does not own the consigned goods.155 Some courts have found, however, that section
9-319(a) enables a consignee to create a security interest in consigned goods even though the security agreement limits the description to property owned by the debtor.156
The few courts that have addressed this issue are divided
on whether section 9-319(a)’s grant of consignor’s rights and title
to the consignee enables a consignee to grant a security interest
in the consigned goods notwithstanding restrictive ownership
language in a security agreement that might otherwise prevent
150 Id.

§ 9-203.

151 Id.
152 Id.

§ 9-203(b)(2).
TSA Stores, Inc. v. M J Soffe, LLC (In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc.), 565
B.R. 292, 302 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017).
154 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
155 See Kraken Invs. Ltd. v. Jacobs (In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC),
No. 14CV3544(VB), 2014 WL 7389901, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014).
156 See Woven Treasures, Inc. v. Hudson Capital, LLC, 46 So. 3d 905, 915
(Ala. 2009).
153
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attachment under section 9-203(b)(3)(A).157 In most of these cases,
consignors have contended that section 9-319(a) is inapplicable
because a consignee’s creditors cannot attach their security interests to the consigned goods where their security agreements
describe the collateral as only that property owned by the debtor.158
However, most of the courts that have addressed this issue have
found the consignors’ arguments unpersuasive.159 These courts
have emphasized section 9-319(a)’s language, which grants the
consignee the rights and title of the consignor enabling it to create a security interest in such goods despite the restrictive ownership language in their security agreements.160
In Woven Treasures, Inc., the consignor contended that
section 9-319(a) was inapplicable since the security agreement
described the collateral as “merchandise” and it defined “merchandise” as property owned by the consignee.161 The Supreme
Court of Alabama rejected the consignor’s argument emphasizing that under section 9-319(a) the consignee is “deemed to have
rights and title to the goods identical to those the consignor had,”
and that the definition of “own” includes rightfully possessing property.162 The court concluded that TSR Imports as a consignee
rightfully possessed the consigned goods thereby enabling it to
grant a security interest to its secured creditor.163 And in Sensient
Flavors, LLC, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated that section
In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc., 565 B.R. at 304; Woven Treasures, Inc., 46
So. 3d at 915; Sensient Flavors, LLC v. Crossroads Debt, LLC, No. 302323, 2013
WL 5857604, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2013). But see In re Salander-O’Reilly
Galleries, LLC, 2014 WL 7389901, at *3–4 (holding that Section 9-319(a) does
not grant a consignee the power to grant a security interest in consigned goods to
its secured creditor if the security agreement describes the collateral as only
that property owned by the consignee).
158 In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc., 565 B.R. at 303; Woven Treasures, Inc., 46
So. 3d at 915. But see In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC, 2014 WL 7389901,
at *3.
159 In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc., 565 B.R. at 304; Woven Treasures, Inc., 46
So. 3d. at 915.
160 In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc., 565 B.R. at 304; Woven Treasures, Inc., 46
So. 3d at 915.
161 Woven Treasures, Inc., 46 So. 3d at 915.
162 Id.
163 Id.
157
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9-319(a) “allows a consignee to grant a security interest in property that it does not own.”164
At least one court has found, however, that a consignee’s
creditor’s security interest did not attach to consigned goods where
the collateral description in the security agreement limited the
property to goods owned by the consignee.165 In In re SalanderO’Reilly Galleries, LLC, a federal district court for the Southern
District of New York found that secured creditor’s security interest did not attach to consigned goods because the collateral
description of the loan agreement between consignee/debtor and
the bank only granted the bank a security interest in goods owned
or hereinafter acquired by the consignee/debtor.166 The case was
on appeal from the bankruptcy court, which had denied the consignor’s summary judgment motion in which it argued that the
collateral description in the loan agreement only granted the bank a
security interest in the artwork owned by the consignee.167
The federal district court agreed with the consignor’s argument.168 It held that the plain language of the security
agreement provided that a security interest would attach only to
personal property “owned or thereafter owned” by the consignee,
and since the consignor, not the consignee, was the owner of the
consigned goods, the secured creditor could not attach its lien to
the good.169 In arriving at this conclusion, the court interpreted
the term “hereafter acquired” to include only those goods that
the debtor acquired through ownership, instead of through other
means, such as consignment, entrustment, or the like.170 The
court’s ruling centered on contract interpretation, which the
court concluded was governed by the plain meaning of the contract.171 According to the court, the plain meaning of the contract clearly indicated that the parties’ intent was only to grant
Sensient Flavors, LLC v. Crossroads Debt, LLC, No. 302323, 2013 WL
5857604, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2013).
165 Kraken Invs. Ltd. v. Jacobs (In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC),
506 B.R. 600, 610 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d, No. 14CV3544(VB), 2014 WL
7389901, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at *3.
164

2019] UNTANGLING THE WEB OF CONSIGNMENT LAW 443
the bank a security interest in the personal property that its
debtor/consignee owned.172
The court did not address, however, whether the consignment transaction was an Article 9 consignment, so the opinion
did not contain a discussion concerning the legal scope of section
9-319(a).173 The secured creditor had assigned its interest to the
bankruptcy trustee, which had filed a partial summary judgment
motion with the bankruptcy court alleging that the consignment
agreement satisfied the various attributes of section 9-102(a)(20);
but the court found that it had failed to “provide any evidentiary
support for these allegations.”174 The bankruptcy court had denied the trustee’s partial summary judgment motion finding that
material issues of fact existed that precluded judgment for the
trustee.175 The court concluded that the trustee, at trial, would
have the burden of proof with regard to each attribute enumerated in 9-102(a)(20).176 The trustee did not appeal the bankruptcy
court ruling, and the federal district court’s holding was limited
to remanding the case to the bankruptcy court with instructions
to enter summary judgment in favor of the consignor.177
In In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc., the bankruptcy court for the
District of Delaware found the reasoning in In re Salander-O’Reilly
Galleries, LLC to be unpersuasive.178 In the case, a secured creditor of the consignee filed a motion for partial summary judgment
arguing that the consignment qualified as an Article 9 consignment
thereby granting it priority because consignor’s security interest
was unperfected.179 The secured creditor contended that the consignee/debtor “would be deemed to have an interest in consigned
Id. at *3–4. In a footnote to the case, the court also indicated that extrinsic evidence proffered by the consignor proved that the parties’ that the loan
be secured only with “dealer owned inventory,” and the court stated that the
extrinsic evidence “provides an alternative basis for [its] ruling.” Id. at *5 n.3.
173 Id. at *1–5.
174 Id. at *3. The trustee did not rely on its status as a judicial lien creditor
to assert its claim to the consigned goods. In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries,
LLC., 506 B.R. at 607. The court indicated that the consignment agreement
had expired apparently prepetition. Id. at 607, 612.
175 Id. at 607.
176 Id. at 609.
177 In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC, 2014 WL 7389901, at *5.
178 TSA Stores, Inc. v. M J Soffe, LLC (In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc.), 565
B.R. 292, 304 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017).
179 Id. at 299.
172
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goods sufficient to grant a security interest to [it] pursuant to section 9-319(a).”180 Relying on the holding in In re SalanderO’Reilly Galleries, LLC the consignor in In re TSAWD Holdings
argued that the consignee’s secured party had not created a security interest in the consigned goods because the security agreement defined the collateral as “property owned by the Debtors
[consignees].”181 The court rejected the consignor’s argument noting
that Salander-O’Reilly was distinguishable because it “did not address the issue of material fact (as to whether the consignment
agreement was governed by the UCC),” which was the issue before
the court in In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc.182 The court also denied
the secured creditors motion for partial summary judgment finding
that the “question of whether the UCC is applicable raises a disputed issue of material fact which precludes partial judgment on
the pleadings.”183
The court in In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc. was incorrect in
rejecting the consignor’s argument. Contrary to the court’s holding,
the In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC decision is persuasive.
Even if a consignment is governed by Article 9, section 9-319(a)
should not be interpreted as granting a consignee the power to
create a security interest in consigned goods not covered by the
security agreement description. Courts that have found otherwise
have misconstrued section 9-319(a). While the PEB Draft Commentary indicates that a consignee has “the rights in and the
power to transfer the consigned goods,” it emphasizes that a
security interest only becomes enforceable after the “other requirements of section 9-203(b) [have been] satisfied.”184 The significance of section 9-319(a) should not be understated; but its scope
in relation to the rights of secured creditors of a consignee is
limited to that of an enabling provision, which permits the satisfaction of section 9-203(b)(2). It does not vitiate the requirement of
section 9-203(b)(3), which provides that a security agreement description must cover the consigned goods to create an enforceable
security interest.185 A security agreement is a contract subject to
180 Id.

at 304.
at 303.
182 Id. at 304.
183 Id.
184 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 6.
185 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
181 Id.
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the principles of contract law.186 And absent an ambiguity in the
contract, a description that limits property to that owned by the
consignee plainly signifies the parties’ intent not to grant a security
interest in consigned goods in the possession of the consignee.187
Nonetheless, the court’s ruling in In re Salander-O’Reilly
Galleries, LLC is problematic for secured lenders, which often
describe collateral as inventory “whether now owned and hereafter acquired.”188 After the ruling, secured lenders will need to
eliminate the “ownership” reference in security agreements and
financing statement descriptions to reach consigned goods.189
Clarks’ Secured Transactions Monthly suggests that secured
creditors considering describing the collateral in the financings
statement as follows: “All assets in which the debtor now has or
hereafter acquires rights or the power to transfer rights,” and
describing the collateral in the security agreement as “all inventory, accounts, equipment, and general intangibles, whether the
debtor currently has or hereafter acquires rights (or the power to
transfer rights) in the foregoing.”190
c. Perfection of, and Priority in Consigned Goods by
Consignee’s Secured Creditors
Even if a consignee’s creditor successfully attaches its security interest to the consigned goods, it must perfect its security
interest to prevail against an unperfected consignor.191 One common means of perfection is by filing a financing statement.192 To
avoid the result reached in In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries,
LLC, a secured creditor should avoid restrictive collateral descriptions in its financing statement that limit collateral to property
186 Id.

§ 9-204(d).
M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 136 (7th ed. 2014).
188 New York Consignment Case Illustrates Danger of After Acquired Property Clauses, 33 CLARKS’ SECURED TRANSACTIONS MONTHLY NO. 6, at 1 (2017).
189 Id. at 2.
190 Id.
191 U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). If the
consignee’s creditor is unperfected then priority will be determined based on
which party attached first, in which case the consignor will prevail since its
interest is automatic under Section 1-201(b)(35). See id. § 9-322(a)(3).
192 See TSA Stores Inc. v. M J Soffe, LLC (In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc.),
565 B.R. 292, 299 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017).
187 JOSEPH

446 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:413
owned by the consignee. Assuming its financing statement sufficiently describes the consigned goods, a consignee’s creditor will
have priority over an unperfected consignor pursuant to section
9-322(a)(2), which grants priority to a perfected secured creditor
over an unperfected one.193
3. Judicial Lien Creditors’ Attachment of Consigned Goods
Section 9-319(a) applies also to judicial lien creditors such
as bankruptcy trustees, which can attach liens to consigned goods
as hypothetical lien creditors pursuant to section 544(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code.194 In effect, “[t]he trustee hypothetically extends
credit to the debtor at the time of [bankruptcy petition] filing and,
at that moment, obtains a judicial lien on all property in which the
debtor has any interest that could be reached by a creditor.”195
Moreover, a debtor-in-possession assumes the rights of the hypothetical lien creditor under section 544(a)(1) to act for the benefit
of the bankruptcy’s estate creditors, even though in its role as the
consignee, it does not have any power to avoid an unperfected security interest of its consignor.196 The knowledge of a pre-petition
debtor regarding the existence of consignment arrangements is
not imputed to a debtor-in-possession in a bankruptcy.197
Section 9-317(a)(2) grants lien creditors such as bankruptcy
trustees priority over unperfected security interest, thereby allowing
193 U.C.C.

§ 9-322(a)(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2012); see Kraken Invs. Ltd. v. Jacobs (In re SalanderO’Reilly Galleries, LLC), 475 B.R. 9, 22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
195 In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC, 475 B.R. at 22 (quoting Musso
v. Ostashko, 468 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2006)).
196 French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey Creations, LLC (In re Downey
Creations, LLC), 414 B.R. 463, 473 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009) (noting that Article 9
is only relevant to the consignee’s dispute because its Chapter 11 bankruptcy
filing places it in the “shoes of a hypothetical lien creditor”); see also In re Valley
Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 132 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002); In re G.S. Distribution, 331
B.R. 552, 561 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that a “consignor must ordinarily file
a financing statement in order to protect its interest in the property from the
claims of a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession acting on behalf of the estate’s creditors under the ‘strong arm powers’ of § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code”).
197 In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. at 132; see ATG Aerospace, Inc. v.
High-Line Aviation Ltd. (In re High-Line Aviation, Inc.), 149 B.R. 730, 739 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1992).
194
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them to avoid a consignor’s unperfected security interest.198 It is
worth noting that the ruling in In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries,
LLC would not affect judicial lien creditors since their interests
in the consigned goods is statutorily, not contract, based.199 However, neither a trustee nor a debtor-in-possession can assert the
avoidance powers under section 544(a)(1) if the consigned goods
have been returned to the consignor before the petition filing.200
To protect their interests against trustees and debtors-inpossession asserting avoidance powers under section 544(a)(1),
consignors need to perfect their security interest.201
V. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ARTICLE 9 CONSIGNMENT LAW
A. Introduction
As courts have begun to apply Revised Article 9 to determine
whether a consignee’s creditors can assert claims to consigned
goods they continue to wrestle with some of the same issues courts
encountered when analyzing whether consignments qualified as
“sale and return” transactions under former section 2-326.202 In
large part, courts are confronted with many of the same issues
because Article 9, in many respects, is a reformulation of former
section 2-326. In addition, the Article 9 revisions have generated
new issues. For the most part, the issues fall generally into one
of the following three categories: (1) What qualifies as an Article
U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see
Kraken Invs. Ltd. v. Jacobs (In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC), 506 B.R.
600, 606 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, No. 14CV3544(VB), 2014 WL 7389901, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014).
199 The trustee did not rely on its status as a judicial lien creditor to assert
its claim to the consigned goods. In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC, 506
B.R. at 607. The court indicated that the consignment agreement had expired
apparently pre-petition. Id. at 607, 612.
200 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 6; see also In re SalanderO’Reilly Galleries, LLC, 506 B.R. at 612 (allowing the trustee to assert an
interest in consigned goods even though the consignment expired pre-petition,
because the trustee was not seeking to avoid the consignor’s interest pursuant to the strong arm clause of section 544(a)(1), but rather asserting its interest as an assignee of one of the consignee’s secured creditors whose security
interest had attached to the consigned goods prior to the petition filing).
201 French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey Creations, LLC (In re Downey
Creations, LLC), 414 B.R. 463, 467 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009).
202 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 1.
198
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9 consignment;203 (2) Who has the burden of proving that a consignment agreement qualifies as an Article 9 consignment;204 and
(3) What law governs if the consignment does not qualify as an
Article 9 consignment.205
Much of the confusion surrounding the first issue involves
interpreting the various elements section 9-102(a)(20) in a manner that most efficaciously serves the underlying goals the UCC
sought to achieve in placing consignments within the scope of
Article 9.206 The second issue concerning the burden of proof is
one on which courts are also split.207 Former section 2-326 explicitly provided that the consignor had to prove it qualified for one of
three section 2-326 exceptions to avoid claims of a consignee’s
creditors.208 Revised Article 9 is silent on the issue, but the phraseology of several of the section 9-102(a)(20) elements suggests that
the burden is on the party seeking protection under the section.209
The third issue concerning what law governs if the consignment
does not qualify as an Article 9 consignment has confounded some
courts, which have found that such consignments should be governed by revised section 2-326, even though Official Comment 4
to that section explicitly states that true consignments dealt with
under former section 2-326 have been replaced by new provisions
in Article 9.210
This section of the Article will examine post-1999 judicial
treatment concerning each of the above-mentioned issues.
B. What Qualifies as an Article 9 Consignment?
Courts have been presented with the following issues concerning whether a consignment agreement qualifies as an Article 9 consignment: (1) Whether the goods have been delivered “to a
203 Id.

at 2–3.
re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 469.
205 See In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869, at *4
(Mass. Sup. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005); In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 123 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2005).
206 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 2–3.
207 In re Haley & Steele, Inc., 2005 WL 3489869, at *4; In re Valley Media,
Inc., 279 B.R. at 123.
208 U.C.C. § 2-326 (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999).
209 Id. § 9-102(a)(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
210 Id. § 2-326 cmt. 4.
204 In
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merchant for the purpose of sale;”211 (2) Whether the merchant
“deals in goods of that kind under a name” other than the consignor;212 (3) Whether “it is not generally known by” the merchant’s creditors that the merchant is “substantially engaged in
selling the goods of others;”213 (4) Whether the consignment is a
consumer consignment excluded from Article 9;214 and (5) Whether
the transaction “create[s] a security interest that secures an obligation.”215
1. Delivery to a “Merchant for the Purpose of Sale” 216
To qualify as an Article 9 consignment the delivery of goods
to the merchant must be for the purpose of sale.217 As such, true
bailments are excluded from the scope of Article 9 consignments
since bailment agreements do not allow the bailee to sell the good
delivered.218 In In re Greenline Equipment, Inc., the bankruptcy
court for the Northern District of Mississippi concluded that delivery of equipment to a merchant for storage with an occasional
infrequent sale by the merchant to a third party was not a delivery
“for the purpose of sale.”219 The owner of the goods, Foster Brothers,
delivered its equipment for temporary storage, and on an infrequent basis, the equipment was purchased by a third party.220
The court concluded that the delivery of goods at best involved a
bailment agreement in which the identical thing delivered was
returned after the purpose of the bailment had been fulfilled. 221
And it viewed the occasional infrequent sales as incidental, not
as consignment sales.222
211 Id.
212 Id.

§ 9-102(a)(20).

213 Id.
214 Id.

§ 9-102(a)(20) cmt. 14.
§ 9-102(a)(20)(D).
216 Id. § 9-102(a)(20).
217 Id.; see also JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., v. AVCO Corp. (In re Citation
Corp.), 349 B.R. 290, 295 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2006).
218 In re Citation Corp., 349 B.R. at 295–96.
219 Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Greenline Equip., Inc. (In re Greenline Equip., Inc.),
390 B.R. 576, 579 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2008).
220 Id. at 580.
221 Id. at 581.
222 Id.
215 Id.
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a. The Delivery of Raw Materials to Be Processed
One recurring issue with which courts have been presented
is whether the delivery of raw materials to a merchant that subsequently incorporates the raw materials into a final product, either
through manufacturing or processing, is a delivery “for the purpose
of sale.”223 Generally, consignment agreements involving the delivery of raw material provide that the materials will be segregated
from the merchant’s inventory until such time as the material is
ready for processing.224 During its storage in a segregated area,
the consignee is not obliged to pay for the goods.225 Only after the
consignee moves the raw materials from the segregated area for
processing or manufacturing is the consignee invoiced for the
price of the materials it processes.226
White and Summers have referred to these transactions
as “quasi-consignments” and have stated the following regarding
whether the delivery of raw materials is a “delivery to a merchant for the purpose of sale”227:
The definition of “consignment” requires that the goods be delivered “to a merchant for the purpose of sale.” If the goods
are delivered for another purpose as well, such as milling or
Georgetown Steel Co. v. Progress Rail Servs. Corp. (In re Georgetown
Steel Co.), 318 B.R. 352, 358 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2004) (finding that delivery of
HBI, a component of steel, to the consignee which processed it into steel, was
a delivery for the purpose of sale since the HBI was an integral component of
the steel that the consignee sold to its customers); see Barber v. McCord Auto
Supply, Inc. (In re Pearson Indus., Inc.), 147 B.R. 914, 927 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
1992) (finding that the sale of a component part was covered by Section 2-326).
224 Samuel & Son Co. v. Excalibur Mach. Co. (In re Excalibur Mach. Co.), 404
B.R. 834, 838 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009); In re Georgetown Steel Co., 318 B.R. at
354–55 (noting that raw materials were maintained in a segregated area until
processing at which point the consignee had to pay for the materials it processed); Sensient Flavors, LLC v. Crossroads Debt, LLC, No. 302323, 2013
WL 5857604, at *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2013) (noting that the cherries
were maintained in a storage pit until such time as they were processed at
which time the consignee was deemed to have purchased the cherries).
225 In re Excalibur Mach. Co., 404 B.R. at 838; In re Georgetown Steel Co.,
318 B.R. at 354; Sensient Flavors, LLC, 2013 WL 5857604, at *1.
226 In re Excalibur Mach. Co., 404 B.R. at 838; In re Georgetown Steel Co.,
318 B.R. at 354; Sensient Flavors, LLC, 2013 WL 5857604, at *1.
227 WHITE & SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 109, § 22-5 at 116–69.
223
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processing, the transaction is a consignment nonetheless because a purpose of the delivery is “sale.”228

And generally, courts have found that the delivery of raw
materials is a delivery “for the purpose of sale.”229 Georgetown
Steel is an oft-cited case in which the bankruptcy court for the District of South Carolina found that the delivery of HBI, a component of steel, to the consignee, which processed it into steel, was
a delivery for the purpose of sale, since the HBI was an integral
component of the steel that the consignee sold to its customers.230
In In re Georgetown Steel Co., LLC, the owner delivered the HBI
to the consignee, which stored it in a segregated location for its own
inventory and transferred it as needed for processing into steel.231
On a weekly basis, the consignee would report its usage of HBI to
the consignor and would pay the consignor for the amount it had
consumed.232 In concluding that the delivery of raw materials
was a delivery “for the purpose of sale,” the court referenced to
both Official Comment 14 accompanying the Alabama version of
the UCC, which mirrors the UCC Official Comment, and White and
Summers noting that both sources contemplate that the delivery
of such goods is a delivery for the “purpose of sale.”233 Official
Comment 14 accompanying section 9-102(a)(20) provides that:
The definition of “consignment” requires that goods be delivered “to a merchant for the purpose of sale.” If the goods are
delivered for another purpose as well, such as milling or processing, the transaction is a consignment nonetheless because
a purpose of delivery is sale.234

However, not all courts have followed the guidance provided in the Official Comments.235 In In re Excalibur Machine,
the bankruptcy court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
228 Id.

at 1169 (emphasis added).
In re Georgetown Steel Co., 318 B.R. at 358; see Barber v. McCord Auto
Supply, Inc. (In re Pearson Indus., Inc.), 147 B.R. 914, 927 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992).
230 In re Georgetown Steel Co., 318 B.R. at 354.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 358.
234 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) cmt. 14. (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017)
(emphasis added).
235 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 3–4.
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found that the delivery of raw materials constituted a consignment
transaction, but that the subsequent sale of the finished product
by the merchant was a sales transaction governed by section 2401.236 The court held that a consignment agreement existed between the parties while the raw materials were in storage, but
concluded that their relationship became that of debtor and creditor
amounting to a sales transaction once the raw materials were
transferred for processing.237
In In re Excalibur Machine, the consignor delivered steel
plates to be used in the consignee’s manufacturing process.238 Similar to other consignments involving the delivery of raw materials, the consignee stored the steel plates in a segregated area until
such time as it used them in the manufacturing process.239 Once
the steel plates were transported from the segregated area for processing, the consignor invoiced the consignee for the consigned
goods.240 Subsequently, the consignee processed the steel plates into
a finished product, which it sold on account to its customers.241 The
consignor claimed a priority interest in the accounts receivables.242
The consignment agreement was entitled a “Consignment
Security Agreement,” which granted the consignor a “continuing
security interest in the Consigned Goods.” 243 The consignor also
filed a financing statement that expanded the collateral description to include consigned goods, including, but not limited to, the
consigned steel plates.244 The court narrowly interpreted the “consigned goods” description in the consignment security agreement
to include only the raw materials.245 Even though the court recognized that the financing statement description “attempted to
expand the scope” of the consigned goods to include the finished
236 Samuel & Son Co. v. Excalibur Mach. Co. (In re Excalibur Mach. Co.), 404
B.R. 834, 839–40 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009).
237 Id.
238 Id. at 838.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 837.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 840.
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product, it emphasized that the language of the security agreement,
not the financing statement, determined the parties’ intent.246
And the court viewed the collateral description in the security
agreement as intending only to grant a security interest in the
“raw material that remained in segregated storage on the [consignee’s] premises and the proceeds of any sale of those raw materials to third parties.”247
Accordingly, the court found that the relationship between
the parties “changed when [the consignee] took the raw steel into
its facility [for processing].”248 Once the steel was transferred for
processing a “relationship of debtor and creditor existed, rather
than that of consignor and consignee” because at that point “there
was an agreement to pay a specific amount” resulting in a sale.249
The court concluded that once the consignee incorporated the
steel plates into its product, it was no longer segregated, and that
the consignee handled the purchased steel plate as its own.250
And the purchased steel plates became the property of the consignee subject to claims of its creditors.251 The court proceeded to
apply Article 2, which governs the sale of goods, noting that under
New York UCC section 2-401, title passes from the seller to a buyer
once “the seller completes its performance with respect to physical
delivery of the goods.”252 Emphasizing that the consignor’s perfected security interest was limited to the steel plates in the segregated area, the court concluded that the consignor did not have
an interest in accounts receivable proceeds that the consignee
had received from the sale of the finished product.253
It is confounding that the court concluded that the parties
only intended to execute a consignment agreement with respect
to the raw materials. By itself, the delivery of the raw materials
could not qualify as a consignment arrangement.254 In a consignment arrangement, the merchant to whom the goods are delivered
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.

at 839.
at 839–40.
250 Id. at 839.
251 Id. at 840.
252 Id. at 839.
253 Id. at 840.
254 U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 14 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
249 Id.
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agrees to sell the delivered goods to a third party. 255 The merchant in Excalibur had no intention of selling the steel plates to
third parties.256 Rather, the merchant and the owner of the steel
plates intended that the merchant sell the finished product to
third parties, which suggests that the parties intended the term
“consigned goods” to include the finished product.257
The court’s approach clearly undermines the goals of Article
9 to provide greater clarity and uniformity regarding the respective rights of consignors and creditors of consignees.258 As required
by Article 9, the consignor in In re Excalibur Mach. Co. dutifully
filed its financing statement to protect its interest against the
consignee’s creditors.259 Despite its diligence in filing, the consignor’s interest was subordinated to both the competing consignee
creditor and the consignee, which was a debtor-in-possession.260
In this respect, the court’s ruling provided a windfall to the both
the debtor-in-possession and its secured creditor, while inequitably penalizing the consignor.261 Article 9 consignment rules were
devised to provide priority to consignees’ creditors when undisclosed consignment agreements created secret liens on what appeared to the creditors as consignee’s inventory.262 But no secret
liens existed in this case.263 The consignor had filed a financing
statement, which gave the consignee’s creditors notice of the
consignment.264 The court’s subordination of the consignor’s interest reflects a complete lack of appreciation for the legal framework devised by Article 9 to protect the respective rights of the
consignor and competing creditors of the consignee.
255 In

re Excalibur Mach. Co., 404 B.R. at 839.

256 Id.

Interestingly, the court’s ruling does not address whether the consignor
would have been more successful if its description in the consignment agreement and financing statement would have included specifically all final products into which steel plates are incorporated. However, the Official Comment
14 to Section 9-102(a)(20) does not require such specification. U.C.C. § 9-102
cmt. 14 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
258 See Boatmen’s Nat’l Bank of St. Louis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 106
F.3d 227, 230–31 (8th Cir. 1997).
259 U.C.C. § 9-310 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
260 See In re Excalibur Mach. Co., 404 B.R. at 840–41.
261 See id.
262 See In re G.S. Distrib., Inc., 331 B.R. 552, 561 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
263 See generally In re Excalibur Mach. Co., 404 B.R. at 834.
264 Id. at 838.
257
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Another issue concerning the delivery of raw materials is
whether the “purpose for sale” requirement is satisfied if the
finished product is sold back to the consignor rather than to a third
party. Section 9-102(a)(20) does not specifically require that the
merchant sell the consigned goods to someone other than its owner,
but the most sensical interpretation of the provision is that merchant must sell the goods to a third party, rather than to the
owner.265 By its very definition, consignments involve owners delivering goods to a merchant for resell to third parties.266 Owners
consign their goods to merchants to secure a market in which to
sell them, which indicates their intent to sell their goods to third
parties, rather than back to themselves.267
Generally, courts have found that the delivery of raw materials to be incorporated into a finished product to be sold back
to the owner is not a consignment.268 Consistent with the judicial
opinion, White and Summers have stated that: “If despite their
processing and commingling, the goods are returned to the owner
and not sold to a third person, the transaction is not a consignment under 1999 Article 9 ....”269
Courts have viewed these such transactions as true bailments, not consignment transactions.270 In Citation, the bankruptcy
court for the Northern District of Alabama found that a bailment
contract existed between parties when the owner of steel delivered it to a manufacturer to produce airplane crankshafts with
the instruction that all crankshafts produced were to be sold to
the owner.271 The court emphasized that the merchant never
purchased the raw materials and the agreement only allowed the
merchant to sell the finished product back to the owner of the
steel.272 And at all times, the title remained with the owner.273
Even though variations of the term “consign” appeared sixty-eight
times in the contract, the court stated, “that the term alone was
265 See

U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
§ 9-102 cmt. 14.
267 See United States v. Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d 287, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
268 See JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. AVCO Corp. (In re Citation Corp.),
349 B.R. 290, 296–97 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2006).
269 WHITE & SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 109, § 22-5 at 1169.
270 See In re Citation Corp., 349 B.R. at 297.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 291.
273 Id. at 292.
266 Id.
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not ‘magical.’”274 The court found no evidence in the agreement
that the intent of the parties was to create a consignment agreement subject to the UCC.275
But at least one court has found that the delivery of raw
materials incorporated into a finished product that was sold back
subsequently to the owner of the raw materials was a delivery
“for the purpose of sale.”276 In Sensient Flavors, the Michigan
Court of Appeals found that Sensient’s delivery of raw materials
consisting of raw cherries, coloring, and flavoring to a Cherry
Blossom with the understanding that the Cherry Blossom would
process the raw materials and sell the finished product back to
the Sensient involved a delivery “for the purpose of sale.”277 Sensient maintained a weekly account of the costs of the delivered
materials and setoff weekly from the purchase price of the finished
product the price of the raw cherries, colorings, and flavorings
that Cherry Blossom had purchased from Sensient.278
In concluding that the cherries were delivered to the consignee “for the purpose of sale,” the court analogized the arrangement between Sensient and Cherry Blossom to the consignment
arrangement in Georgetown Steel in which a bankruptcy court
found that the delivery of raw materials subsequently processed
into a finished product and sold to third parties was a delivery
“for the purpose of sale.”279 In its analogy, the court minimalized
the most significant distinction between Georgetown and Sensient,
the former involved the sale of the finished products to third
parties, while the latter involved the consignee selling the finished product back to the consignor.280 The court diminished the
distinction by stating that, “the cherries were delivered to Cherry
Blossom for the purpose of sale, regardless of the fact that the sale
was back to Sensient [the owner of the cherries].”281
The court’s reliance on Georgetown Steel is misplaced. Having mistakenly determined that the transaction was an Article 9
274 Id.

275 Id.

at 296.

276 Sensient Flavors, LLC v. Crossroads Debt, LLC, No. 302323, 2013 WL
5857604, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2013).
277 Id.
278 Id. at *2.
279 Id. at *7.
280 Id.
281 Id. (emphasis added).
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consignment, the court held that the consignee’s secured creditor
had priority in the cherries, thereby subordinating the consignor’s
unperfected security interest.282 The court should have analyzed
the parties’ rights under the common law, which is essentially the
law of bailment, which would have granted priority to the consignor.283 The court’s decision to include the transaction within
the scope of Article 9 rendered an inequitable result inconsistent
with the underlying policy goals of Article 9.284
2. Merchant Deals in Goods of That Kind in a Name Other
Than in the Name of the Person Making Delivery
Section 9-102(a)(20) requires that the merchant to whom the
goods are delivered deal in goods of that kind under a name other
than in the name of the consignor.285 To satisfy the requirement, the
party must prove that (1) the merchant deals in goods of that kind
delivered to it; and (2) the merchant deals in those goods under a
name other than the deliverer.286 Both requirements must be satisfied to qualify as an Article 9 consignment.287 If the merchant either
does not deal in goods of the kind delivered or deals in goods of
that kind in the name of the consignor, its creditors should reasonably assume that the merchant lacks sufficient rights in the
goods that it possesses.288 Either event places the merchant’s
creditors on notice; thereby avoiding the problem of being misled by
apparent ownership of goods held by the consignee.289
a. Merchant Dealing in Goods of That Kind
One issue that has arisen is whether a merchant to whom
raw materials are delivered “deals in goods of that kind” since
the final product the merchant sells is different than the raw
282 Id.

at *8.
See In re Music Center RV, LLC, 304 S.W.3d 806, 810 (Tenn. 2010); In
re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869, at *4 (Mass. Sup.
Ct. Nov. 14, 2005).
284 See Georgetown Steel Co. v. Progress Rail Servs. Corp. (In re Georgetown
Steel Co.), 318 B.R. 352, 363 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2004).
285 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
286 Id.
287 See In re G.S. Distrib., Inc., 331 B.R. 552, 561 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
288 Id.
289 Id.
283
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materials delivered to it.290 When confronted with this issue,
courts have found that the inclusion of goods into a final product
was sufficient to establish that the merchant “deals in goods of
that kind.”291 In In re Georgetown Steel Company, the issue presented was whether the delivery of hot briquetted iron (“HBI”) to
a merchant that planned to process it into steel satisfied the
“deals in goods of that kind” requirement.292 The court found
that the merchant satisfied the requirement noting that the HBI
was typically considered part of the inventory of manufacturers
like the consignee and that the HBI was an “integral component
part of the [consignee’s] final product.”293
b. Merchant Dealing in Goods Under a Name Other Than
the Name of the Person Making Delivery
The test for determining whether a merchant deals under
a name other than the consignor is the same test courts applied
when consignments were subject to former section 2-326.294 A party
seeking protection under subsection 9-102(a)(20)(A)(i) must prove
that the consignee was neither “completely enveloped”295 in, nor
“completely identified”296 with, the consignor’s business “that potential creditors would necessarily assume that the business was
that of the consignor solely.”297 In In re G.S. Distribution, the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of New York noted the purpose of the subsection by stating:
This subsection [9-102(a)(20)(A)(i)] is designed to carry out
one of the purposes of making consignments subject to Article
9, which is to ensure that a consignee’s general creditors are
put on notice of the consignor’s interest in the consigned property, and ‘to protect general creditors of the consignee from claims
of consignors that have undisclosed consignment arrangements
290 Georgetown Steel Co. v. Progress Rail Servs. Corp. (In re Georgetown
Steel Co.), 318 B.R. 352, 358 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2004).
291 Id. at 358.
292 Id. at 358–59.
293 Id.
294 See supra Part III.
295 In re G.S. Distrib., Inc., 331 B.R. 552, 562 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
296 Id.
297 Quaker City Iron Works, Inc. v. Ganz (In re Wicaco Mach. Corp.), 49 B.R.
340, 343 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (quoting Mann v. Clark Oil and Refining Corp.,
302 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (D.C.E.D.Mo. 1969), aff’d, 425 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1970)).
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with the consignee that create secret liens in the inventory.’
Where a consignee operates only under the name of the consignor,
the U.C.C. assumes that the consignee’s general creditors will
be on notice of the consignment and will not be misled into believing that the merchant has ownership of the inventory in
its possession.298

In In re G.S. Distribution, the court found section 9-102
(a)(20)(A)(i) was not satisfied because the consignee was completely
enveloped in the consignor’s business because it “held itself out to
the public as a [consignor] store.”299 The consignee only sold the
goods of the consignor, and it only sold goods under the name of
the consignor.300 The court noted, however, that a consignee is not
completely enveloped in its consignor’s business if the consignee
sells goods of other suppliers in addition to those of the consignor or
if it is known that the consignee is a separate entity.301
Under former section 2-326, courts found that merchants
selling goods under the name of the consignor, while also selling
similar goods under their own name, were doing business under
a name other than the consignor.302 They reasoned that since
the consignee was selling similar goods under its own name, it
was not completely enveloped by the consignors’ names; therefore, the consignee’s creditors could have reasonably concluded
that consignee’s complete inventory of goods were owned by the
consignee.303 Most likely, courts applying section 9-102(a)(20)
will apply the same reasoning, since consignee’s ostensible ownership of consigned goods was the genesis underlying the UCC
adoption of consignment rules to protect consignee’s creditors
against undisclosed consignment arrangements.304
3. Not Generally Known by its Creditors to be Substantially
Engaged in Selling the Goods of Others
Section 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) provides that a transaction does
not qualify as an Article 9 consignment if it is generally known
298 In

re G.S. Distrib., Inc., 331 B.R. 552, 561 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
at 562 (alteration in original).
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 In re Wicaco Mach. Corp. 49 B.R. at 343.
303 Id.
304 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
299 Id.
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by the consignee’s creditors that the consignee is substantially
engaged in the business of selling goods of others.305 The requirement was one of the former section 2-326(3) exceptions, but phraseology in Article 9 differs; former section 2-326(3)(b) was phrased
in the affirmative, while section 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) is phrased in
the negative.306 Under former section 2-326(3)(b), the consignor had
to prove the consignee’s practices were generally known by its creditors,307 while section 9-102 (a)(20)(A)(iii) requires a party to prove
that the consignee’s practices were not generally known.308 The
negative framing of the phraseology supports the contention that
the party seeking protection under section 9-102(a)(20) has the burden of proof, instead of placing the burden on the consignor, which is
what former section 2-326(3) required.309 To satisfy the “generally
known” requirement a party must prove that (1) the consignee is
substantially engaged in selling the goods of others, and (2) that the
consignee’s practices are generally known by the creditors.310
a. “Not Generally Known” Requirement311
In interpreting section 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii), courts continue
to apply the standards adopted by those courts that dealt with
the “generally known” requirement in former section 2-326.312 Like
those earlier court opinions, courts applying section 9-102(a)(20)
are split on whether a party can satisfy the “generally known” standard by merely proving that the competing creditor of the consignee has actual knowledge of the consignee’s practices.313 Some
courts have found the “generally known” standard requires a party
305 Id.

306 Compare id., with U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(b) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM’N, amended 1999).
307 See U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
amended 1999).
308 See Id. § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
309 Id. § 2-326(3).
310 French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey Creations, LLC (In re Downey
Creations, LLC), 414 B.R. 463, 471 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009) (noting that even if
actual knowledge by the consignee’s creditor was sufficient to satisfy the “generally
known” test, the consignor had not proven that the consignee was substantially
engaged in selling goods of others); In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 124–25
(Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
311 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
312 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 472.
313 In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. at 124.
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prove that a “majority” of creditors have actual knowledge of the
consignee’s practices,314 while others have interpreted the standard to mean that only the competing creditor have actual knowledge of such practices.315
Those courts requiring a “majority” continue to hold that
a “majority” refers to the number of creditors, not the amount of the
consignee’s creditors’ claims.316 But recent courts have included
within the category of creditors “unsecured claims from utility
companies and other third-party suppliers of goods and services
that may not know exactly what kind of business is conducted
on the [merchant’s] premises.”317 However, courts have stated
that general knowledge regarding custom in the industry has not
been sufficient to satisfy the “generally known” test.318
Courts finding that the “generally known” standard is satisfied when the competing creditor has actual knowledge of the
consignee’s practices have reasoned that a creditor with actual
knowledge has no need of protection from secret liens because it
was not misled by the consignee’s ostensible ownership of the consigned goods.319 In Fariba, the California Court of Appeals stated:
“[S]ince the purpose of the notice exception is to ‘protect creditors
from the “hidden” claim of the consignor, it should follow that a
creditor of a consignee who has actual knowledge that the consignee is a consignee cannot claim the protection thereof.’”320
314 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 471; In re Morgansen’s Ltd.,
302 B.R. 784, 788 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that “the personal knowledge of
a few protesting consignors [as creditors of the consignee] does not satisfy their
burden of proof of what subjectively the other creditors generally knew or should
have known about the exact nature of the debtor’s business activities.”) (addition for clarification); Rayfield Inv. Co. v. Kreps, 35 So.3d 63, 65–66 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010) (rejecting the trial court’s reasoning that the consignor’s interest
was superior to the perfected security interest of the consignee’s creditor since the
creditor had knowledge that the goods in question were on consignment).
315 Fariba v. Dealer Serv. Corp., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 219, 227–28 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009).
316 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 463 (citing Quaker City Iron
Works v. Ganz (In re Wicaco Mach. Corp.), 49 B.R. 340, 344 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1984)).
317 In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. at 788.
318 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 471 (citing In re Wedlo Holding,
Inc., 248 B.R. 336, 341–42 (N.D. Ill. 2000)).
319 Fariba, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 227–28.
320 Id. (quoting 3A LAWRENCE’S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (3d ed. 2009 supp.)).
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In Fariba, the court echoed the sentiments articulated by
the court in Eurpac v. Republic, in which the court concluded that
it was nonsensical to give greater weight to imputed knowledge
than actual knowledge.321 In Fariba, the court reasoned that if
section 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) imputes knowledge to those creditors
who could have reasonably obtained such knowledge, thereby holding them responsible as if they had actual knowledge, the standard should also be applied to hold responsible those creditors that
have actual knowledge.322 The court concluded that “construing
the knowledge exception to include constructive knowledge, but
not actual knowledge, would lead to absurd results.”323 It concluded
that its interpretation of the “generally known” standard was a
reasonable, commonsense interpretation that was consistent with
the apparent purpose of the legislature’s intent.324
The Permanent Editorial Board in its recent proposed commentary explicitly rejects the position that the “generally known”
standard is satisfied if a party only proves the competing creditor
has knowledge of the consignee’s practices by highlighting the
priority anomaly that would result if actual knowledge by a competing creditor satisfied the “generally known” standard.325 The
Commentary states:
Some authorities have misconstrued the condition contained in
§ 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) by interpreting “generally known by its
creditors” to mean “known by the competing claimant.” Under this
misinterpretation, a given transaction would be a consignment
subject to Article 9’s perfection and priority rules vis-à-vis creditors without actual knowledge that the person in possession is
“substantially engaged in selling goods of others” and would be
excluded from Article 9 as to creditors with that actual knowledge.

321 Id.

at 229.

322 Id.
323 Id.

Id. The court substantiated its holding by quoting to section 1-103 of the
California Commercial Code that stated the Code “shall be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.” Id. But see Rayfield
Inv. Co. v. Kreps, 35 So. 3d 63, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that “some
legal rules explicitly allow their application to be varied by individual circumstances, using equitable principles, but the commercial law on secured transactions is not among them”).
325 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 4.
324
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This anomalous result would open the door to circular priorities without promoting in any Article 9 policy.326

The Permanent Editorial Board has proposed amending Official Comment 14 to section 9-102 to include the following:
Under clause (iii) of subparagraph (A), a transaction is not an
Article 9 “consignment” if the consignee is “generally known
326 Id. at 4–5. The PEB provides the following discussion regarding circular
priorities:
Consider a consignment of goods by Consignor to Consignee that
is within the definition of “consignment” in Article 9. In particular, the consignment meets the condition in § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii)
that Consignee “is not generally known by its creditors to be
substantially engaged in selling the goods of others.” Consignor
fails to file a financing statement against Consignee covering
the goods and so holds an unperfected security interest. While
the goods are in Consignee’s possession, Consignee grants a
security interest in them to SP-1, who knows that Consignee
holds the goods on consignment and perfects a security interest
in them by filing. Thereafter, while the goods are still in Consignee’s possession, Consignee grants a security interest in the
goods to SP-2, who also perfects a security interest in the goods
by filing but lacks knowledge of the consignment. Under Article
9, SP-1’s knowledge of the consignment would be irrelevant.
SP-1’s security interest would attach to Consignor’s rights and
title to the goods and would be perfected by filing, as would SP2’s. See § 9-319(a); § 9-310(a). SP-1’s perfected security interest
would be senior to SP-2’s under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule
of § 9-322(a)(1), and Consignor’s unperfected security interest
would be junior to both perfected security interests under § 9322(a)(2). Now consider what the outcome would be under an
erroneous interpretation of § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii), i.e., that SP-1’s
knowledge of the consignment results in the application of nonUCC law to SP-1’s claim against the goods, even though they
are the subject of an Article 9 consignment. Under non-UCC law,
the consigned goods typically would not be subject to the claims of
Consignee’s creditors. As a consequence of the misinterpretation of § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii), no one of the three competing security interests would have priority over both of the other two,
and a circular priority would arise. Consignor would have nonUCC priority over SP-1; SP-1, as the first to file or perfect, would
have priority over SP-2; and SP-2’s perfected security interest
would have priority over Consignor’s unperfected security interest (which, in turn would have priority over SP-1’s security
interest, and so on).
Id. at 5, n.27.
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by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of
others.” Clause (iii) does not apply solely because a particular
competing claimant knows that the goods are held on consignment. See PEB Commentary No. [ ], dated _______.327

The persistent uncertainty surrounding how to interpret the
“generally known” provision suggests that its elimination from
section 9-102(a)(20) should be considered. The necessity of the
requirement is certainly questionable given the movement of
commercial consignments to Revised Article 9.328 The decision to
include commercial consignments within the scope of Article 9
brings with it the subtle, but significant, shift of placing on the
consignor the burden of protecting its interests by providing notice
to competing creditors.329 Neither the common law nor former
Article 2 placed such an obligation on the consignor.330 And while it
made sense under former Article 2 to include the “generally known”
exception so consignors could avoid claims of creditors that were
aware generally of consignee’s practices, the movement of consignments to Article 9 obviates the need to continue the tradition of
the “generally known” exception. Now consignors have an affirmative duty to provide notice to protect their interests by simply
filing a financing statement to avoid the problems of secret liens.331
The concept of notice is a capstone of Article 9.332 Under
Article 9, the fact that a competing creditor has actual knowledge
of a competing security interest does not undercut its own security interest.333 The relevant questions are whether its competitor provided notice, and if so, when was the notice provided. 334
The perfection rules of Article 9 were devised to achieve notice, and
notice serves a significant role in determining issues of priority.335
A filed financing statement is an efficacious and efficient means
of achieving such notice.336 It provides constructive notice to all
327 Id.

at 7.
& SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 109, § 22-4 at 1167.
329 French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey Creations, LLC (In re Downey
Creations, LLC), 414 B.R. 463, 469 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009).
330 Id. at 467, 470.
331 Id. at 470–71.
332 Id. at 470.
333 Id. at 472.
334 In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 131–32 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
335 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 4–5.
336 In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. at 131.
328 WHITE
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creditors.337 In that regard, it is much more equitable to consignee’s creditors than the “generally known” requirement, which imputes knowledge to unknowing creditors if a majority of them have
actual knowledge.338
b. “Substantially Engaged” Requirement339
The “generally known” standard also requires that the
party prove that the consignee’s creditors generally know that
the consignee is substantially engaged in selling goods of others.340 However, the “substantially engaged standard” does not
require a party to prove that the consignee’s creditors knew all
the consignor’s identities or the specific items on consignment.341
In Rayfield Investment, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals noted that as a “general rule of thumb consignees are not
considered ‘substantially engaged’ in selling the goods of others
unless they hold at least [twenty percent] of inventory on a consignment basis.”342
4. Exclusion of Consumer Goods from Article 9 Consignments
Section 9-102(a)(20)(C) excludes from Article 9 consignments any goods that were consumers goods immediately before
delivery to a merchant.343 In In re Haley & Steele, the Superior
Court of Massachusetts found that consigned goods “consist[ing]
337 In

re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 471.
COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 4.
339 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 472; In re Valley Media, Inc.,
279 B.R. at 125.
340 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 472 (noting that even if actual
knowledge by the consignee’s creditor was sufficient to satisfy the “generally
known” test, the consignor had not proven that the consignee was substantially
engaged in selling goods of others); In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. at 125;
Fariba v. Dealer Serv. Corp., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 219, 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
341 Fariba, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 231.
342 Rayfield Inv. Co. v. Kreps, 35 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
343 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20)(C) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see
In re Music Center RV, LLC, 304 S.W.3d 806, 809 (Tenn. 2010); Mackela v.
Bentley, 614 S.E.2d 648, 650–51 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting secured party’s
claim to consigned goods concluding that the consignment transaction was not
governed by Article 9 because the goods were consumer goods immediately before delivery to the consignee).
338 PEB
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of artwork that was used or bought for use primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes immediately before delivery to
Haley and Steele ... falls outside of the ‘consignment’ defined in
[section] 9-102(a)(20).”344 In In re Haley & Steele, the court articulated the policy underlying the exclusion of consumer goods
by stating that: “[A] typical consumer ... should not be required
to comply with the complexities of secured lending under Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in order to have protection
from [a consignee’s] creditors.”345
In In re Haley & Steele, the court rejected the application
of revised section 2-326 to consumer consignments noting that
the Article 2 provision would subject consumer consigned goods to
claims of competing creditors, which it viewed as contrary to the
Article 9 reasoning for excluding them from the statutory definition of Article 9 consignments.346 Respected commentators James
J. White and Robert S. Summers have posited that the rights of
creditors whose debtors have consignment arrangements with consumer consignors “will have to be determined by looking at the
common law of the particular states.”347
5. Exclusion of Consignments That Create Security InterestSecuring Obligations from Article 9 Consignments
Section 9-102(a)(20)(D) excludes from the definition of Article 9 consignments those consignments that create security
interests “that secure an obligation.”348 By the exclusion, “[t]he
drafters here have preserved a distinction between a conventional
commercial consignment defined in 9-102(a)(20), which in almost
all cases, is a ‘security interest,’ and the unusual commercial
consignment which creates a security interest ‘that secures an
In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869, at *3 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005).
345 Id.
346 Id. at *4 (quoting to the position of James J. White and Robert S. Summers
in 4 Uniform Commercial Code at 38 (5th ed.) that “[i]t is unlikely that the
drafters wished to leave the consumer consignor worse off than a commercial
consignor, yet that would be the outcome if consumer consignments (now excluded
from Article 9) are governed by 2-326”).
347 WHITE & SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 109, § 22-4 at 1167.
348 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
344
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obligation.’”349 However, both transactions are governed by the
perfection and priority rules of Article 9, but the default rules of
Part 6 of the UCC Article 9 handle the two differently.350
The exclusion of consignments intended as a security, “that
secure obligations” from section 9-102(a)(20), is consistent with
how such transactions were treated by the courts under former
section 2-326.351 The major distinction is that Revised Article 9
explicitly provides that such transactions are excluded from the
definition of an Article 9 consignment,352 while former section 2326 did not.353 Post revision, courts continue however to apply the
tests developed by courts that dealt with the issue under section
2-326.354 For example, the court in In re Georgetown Steel Company found that “[w]hether an interest ‘secures an obligation’
has been described as dependent upon whether there is a duty
[of the consignee] to pay for unsold goods.”355
C. Which Party Has the Burden of Proof Under Section 9102(a)(20)?
Another issue on which courts are split is which party has
the burden of proof under section 9-102(a)(20). Several courts
have found that the burden of proof is on the party seeking protection under section 9-102(a)(20).356 In In re Morgansen’s Ltd.,
the bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of New York stated
that the burden of proof is on the party seeking protection under
the statutory definition, but then proceeded to place the burden
on the consignors who were arguing that section 9-102(a)(20) did
349 WHITE

& SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 109, § 22-4 at 1167.
Section 9-601 provides that “this part imposes no duties upon a secured
party that is a consignor,” therefore, the consignor does not have to comply
with the collection, disposition, and enforcement provisions of Part 6 of Article 9. U.C.C. § 9-601(g) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see WHITE
& SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 109, § 22-4 at 1167.
351 See supra Part III for a discussion on Former UCC Article 2 treatment
of consignments.
352 See WHITE & SUMMERS, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 109, § 22-4 at 1167.
353 See id.
354 Georgetown Steel Co. v. Progressive Rail Servs. Corp. (In re Georgetown
Steel Co.), 318 B.R. 352, 360 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2004).
355 Id.
356 See In re G.S. Distrib., Inc., 331 B.R. 552, 561 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
350
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not apply.357 Like In re Morgansen’s, Ltd, the bankruptcy court in
In re G.S. Distribution stated that the burden is on the person seeking protection under section 9-102(a)(2), but unlike the Morgansen’s
opinion, the court consistent with its statement, placed the burden on the debtor asserting that 9-102(a)(20) applied.358 In In re
Salander-O’Reilly Galleries LLC, the bankruptcy court noted that
“in the Second Circuit, the burden of proof falls on the party
claiming applicability of [section] 9-102(a)(20) to show that each
element of the definition is satisfied.”359
Other courts have established, however, a firm rule that the
burden of proof is on the consignor.360 In In re Downey Creations,
LLC, the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Indiana
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the burden should be on the
party seeking protection under the statutory definition.361 The
court found that the burden should be placed on the party bearing the risk under section 9-102(a)(20), which it identified as the
consignor.362 It reasoned that “[a]s between a consignee’s creditors and the consignor, only the consignor is in a position to determine whether its transaction” satisfies the statutory definition
of an Article 9 consignment, and if it determines that its transaction satisfies the definition, the consignor must “file a financing statement to perfect its interest” in the consigned good.363 The
court stated that if the consignor does not file a financing statement, it should “bear the burden of proving that the transaction”
357 In

re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784, 788 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003).
re G.S. Distrib., Inc., 331 B.R. at 561.
359 Jacobs v. Kraken Invs. Ltd. (In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC),
506 B.R. 600, 608–09 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, No. 14CV3544(VB), 2014 WL
7389901, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014).
360 French Design Jewelry, Inc. v. Downey Creations, LLC (In re Downey
Creations, LLC), 414 B.R. 463, 469 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009); In re Morgansen’s Ltd.,
302 B.R. at 788; In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 124 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
361 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 469 (placing the burden of proof
on the consignor to prove that it is generally known by debtor’s creditors that
it was substantially engaged in the business of selling goods of others); TSA
Stores Inc. v. M J Soffe, LLC (In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc.), 565 B.R. 292, 299
(Bankr. D. Del. 2017) (finding that the consignor must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the consignment is not governed by Article 9).
362 In re Downey Creations, LLC, 414 B.R. at 469.
363 Id. at 470.
358 In
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does not satisfy the statutory definition.364 It posited that placing the burden on the consignor creates an incentive for it to file
a financing statement, which consequentially “not only discourages ‘secret liens’, but also provides more predictability, thereby
reducing the need for costly litigation.”365
The court in In re Downey Creations, LLC also reasoned
that the burden should be on the consignor since former section
2-326 explicitly placed the burden on the consignor to prove that
one of the exceptions in section 2-326 (3) was applicable.366 Even
though the court acknowledged that “[s]ection 9-102(a)(20) does
not explicitly assign the burden of proof as former section 2-326
did,” it highlighted that “the purpose behind the provision [section
9-102(a)(20)] suggests to the Court that the burden nevertheless
remains on the consignor.”367
The court’s reliance on former section 2-326 was misplaced.
Former section 2-326(3) explicitly provided that the consignor had
to prove that one of the former section 2-326(3) exceptions applied
to avoid the claims of a consignee’s creditors.368 And each exception was framed in the affirmative—the consignor had to prove
it complied with an applicable sign law; the consignor had to prove
that consignee’s creditors were generally aware of the consignee’s
practices; the consignor had to prove it complied with section 9114.369 In contrast, Article 9 is silent on who bears the burden of
proof.370 And the majority of the elements of section 9-102(a)(20)
are framed in the negative requiring a party to prove that the
merchant “is not an auctioneer;” that the good was “not a consumer
good immediately before delivery;” and that “the transaction does
not create a security interest that secures an obligation.”371 In
addition, a party must prove that “is not generally known by its
creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others,”
364 Id.
365 Id.
366 Id.

at 471.
at 469.

367 Id.
368 U.C.C.

§ 2-326(3) (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended
1999).
369 Id.
370 U.C.C. § 9-114 (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999).
371 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (emphasis added).
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which specifically contrasts with the language of former section
2-326, which required the consignor to prove in the affirmative
that it was “generally known by its creditors to be substantially
engaged in selling the goods of others.”372
If a consignor literally proves the negative with respect to
each of the above-mentioned section 9-102(a)(20) elements, the
consignment transaction would be included, not excluded from
Article 9 coverage; thereby subjecting the consigned goods to a
creditors’ claims absent a financing statement filing by the consignor.373 In many instances, the consignor’s intent is to avoid
coverage under Article 9.374 Rather than establishing a firm rule
that places the burden on the consignor, a more sensical approach
is to place the burden of proof on the party seeking protection
under the statute. Typically, judicial lien creditors and secured
creditors will be the parties seeking protection under 9-102(a)(20).
Placing the burden of proof on the party seeking protection follows both the letter and the spirit of the statute by assigning the
burden to whichever party will benefit from its application.
D. What Law Governs Non–Article 9 Consignments
Another issue that courts have confronted is what law governs non–Article 9 consignments. Most courts have found that
such consignments are governed by the common law of bailment
unless state law other than Article 9 applies.375 A few courts
have posited, however, that those consignments not qualifying as
Article 9 consignments are subject to the “sale or return” provision
of revised section 2-326.376 These courts have taken this position
Compare id. § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(ii), with U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1999) (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999).
373 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
374 See generally id. §§ 9-102(a)(19)–(21), 9-114.
375 In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869, at *4 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005) (concluding that since consumer consignments were
not governed by the UCC after the 1999 revisions, they were once subject to the
common law, which the court concluded was “essentially the law of bailments”).
376 In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 123 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (stating
that “[o]nce it is determined that either former U.C.C. § 2-326(3) or revised U.C.C.
§§ 9-102 (a) (20) & 9-319 (a) applies, the goods are deemed to be on sale or return
with respect to claims made by the creditors of the consignee”); Georgetown
Steel Co. v. Progress Rail Servs. Corp. (In re Georgetown Steel Co.), 318 B.R.
352, 357 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2004) (noting that if a consignment does not satisfy
372
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even though the Official Comment 4 to revised section 2-326 states
“[c]ertain true consignment transactions were dealt with in former [s]ections 2-326(3) and 9-114. These provisions have been deleted and have been replaced by new provisions in Article 9.”377
And while most courts have followed the position expressed
in the Official Comment, the few court opinions that have rejected it
have created some confusion concerning this issue.378
1. Consignment v. “Sale or Return” Transaction379
In part, the confusion likely centers on the outward similarities between consignments and “sale or return” transactions.
Both transactions involve the delivery of goods to a merchant,
which can return the goods to the owner if they are not sold.380
However, the economic realities of the two transactions differ in
ways that render them mutually exclusive.381 “Sale or return”
transactions involve the delivery of goods to a merchant that
purchases them for the purpose of reselling them to its customers.382 The “sale or return” provision under section 2-326 indicates
that the goods are delivered to a buyer, and section 1-103 defines
a buyer as a “person who buys or contracts to buy goods.”383 Even
though the buyer “retains the right to return the goods, a completed sale is generally deemed to have taken place.”384 The merchant becomes the owner to whom title is transferred, despite its
right to return the goods if they are not sold.385 In contrast, consignment transactions involve a type of bailment for the purpose
the Article 9 definition of a consignment “it is likely governed by Article 2”);
In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784, 788–89 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003).
377 U.C.C. § 3-326 cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
378 See PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 3 n.19.
379 U.C.C. § 2-326 (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999).
380 U.C.C. § 2-326 (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999).
381 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 3 (noting that the two transactions “are fundamentally different and are mutually exclusive”).
382 U.C.C. § 2-326 (1999) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1999).
383 Goss v. Morgansen’s Ltd. (In re Morgansen’s Ltd.), No. 04-CV-0268, 2005
WL 2370856, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
384 Id.
385 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 5–6; see Georgetown Steel
Co. v. Progress Rail Servs. Co. (In re Georgetown Steel Co.) 318 B.R. 352, 361
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2004).
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of sale in which the goods are entrusted to the consignee for sale
without transference of title and ownership.386 In the former, the
buyer becomes the owner of the good,387 while in the latter the
consignor is merely an agent selling the goods on behalf of its
principal, the consignor.388
One area in which the issue has arisen is with consumer
consignments, since they are explicitly excluded from Article 9
coverage.389 Courts have found that such transactions are not “sale
or returns” emphasizing that the delivery of such goods neither
involves a purchase nor a transference of title to the merchant.390
Courts have noted that subjecting such consignments to claims of
consignee’s creditors would be contrary to reason for which they
were excluded from the statutory definition of Article 9 consignments,391 thereby circumventing the drafters’ intent to protect
consumers, an intention evidenced by the exclusion of consumer
consignments from the definition of Article 9 consignments.392
In Haley & Steele, the court found that a consignment
transaction in which artwork was delivered by consumers to a
consignee was statutorily excluded from the definition of an Article 9 consignment.393 The court found that the Revised section
2-326 did not apply to consumer consignments because that section contemplated a sale with title passing to the consignee, an
event which did not occur when the consumers delivered their
artwork to the consignee.394 The court reasoned that analyzing
the consumer consignment under 2-326 would subject the consigned goods to the claims of the consignee’s creditor, a result
that would place “the consumer consignor worse off than a commercial consignor.”395
386 PEB

COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 3–4.
re Morgansen’s Ltd., 2005 WL 2370856, at *9.
388 PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 3–4.
389 In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869, at *3 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005).
390 Id.
391 Id.
392 Id. at 4.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869, at *4 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005).
387 In
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In Music City, the bankruptcy court for the Middle District
of Tennessee presented with the question of whether a consumer
consignment should be analyzed under UCC Article 2-326, certified the question to the Supreme Court of Tennessee on how to
handle “orphaned” consignments.396 The Tennessee Supreme Court
noted that the language of section 2-326 referred to a “buyer”
and that Music City, the consignee, did not contract to buy the
goods as the term “buyer” is defined by section 2-103(1), which
defines a buyer as one contracted to buy goods.397 The court concluded that section 2-326 did not apply because the consignee did
not contract to buy the consigned goods, “but rather, as a consignee, [it] agreed to take possession and to try to sell them to a
third party for a commission.”398
While most courts have found that “sale or return” transactions and consignments are mutually exclusive, a few courts
continue to posit that consignments not qualifying as Article 9
consignments are “sale or return” transactions subject to Revised
section 2-326.399 In Morgansen’s Ltd., a bankruptcy court found
that a consignment transaction that did not qualify as an Article
9 consignment should be subject to analysis under Revised section
2-326.400 The Permanent Editorial Board in its proposed draft
Waldschmidt v. Adams (In re Music City RV, LLC), No. 08-07724, 2009
WL 77248, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. Jan 5, 2009).
397 In re Music City RV, LLC, 304 S.W.3d 806, 812 (Tenn. 2010). The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed with the bankruptcy court that the consumer
consignment was not a UCC Article 9 consignment because section 9102(a)(20)(a)(C) excludes goods that are “consumer goods immediately before
delivery.” Id. at 809–10.
398 Id. at 811.
399 In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 123 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (stating that “[o]nce it is determined that either former U.C.C. § 2-326 or revised
U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(20) & 9-319(a) applies, the good are deemed to be on sale or
return with respect to claims made by creditors of the consignee”); Georgetown
Steel Co. v. Progress Rail Servs. Corp. (In re Georgetown Steel Co.), 318 B.R.
352, 357 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2004) (noting that if a consignment does not satisfy
the Article 9 definition of a consignment “it is likely governed by Article 2.”);
In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784, 788–89 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003).
400 In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. at 789. The consignor appealed the bankruptcy court ruling, and on appeal, the federal district court for the Eastern
District of New York remanded the case for clarification from the bankruptcy
court concerning its use of the term “buyer for resale,” emphasizing that, “there is
no evidence that title passed from Goss to Morgansen’s with respect to any of
396
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explicitly rejects the court’s position in Morgansen’s Ltd.401 A
footnote to the PEB Commentary draft indicates that the bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of New York in the In re
Morgansen’s Ltd case erred in finding that consignment transactions that did not satisfy the Article 9-102(a)(20) statutory definition
should be subject to analysis under the UCC Article 2 sale or return
provision.402 The PEB Commentary references In re Morgansen’s
Ltd. by stating, “[r]ather than applying the common law, the court
erroneously turned to [s]ection 2-326 and concluded that ‘the
goods consigned to the debtor clearly were delivered on a “sale or
return” basis.’”403
The PEB Commentary Draft states that consignments and
“sale or return” transactions are mutually exclusive and provides
the following distinction concerning the two types of transactions:
A consignment is a bailment, and the consignor remains the
owner of the consigned goods. A sale or return is, as the name
suggests, a sale, pursuant to which the buyer becomes the owner
of the goods. Absent an agreement otherwise, the seller does not
retain any interest in goods delivered to the buyer. The buyer
becomes the owner of the goods, even though it has a right to
return the goods and to transfer ownership back to the seller.
A sale or return is not a consignment; a consignment is not a
sale or return.404

And the Permanent Editorial Board proposes that the following amendment to Official Comment 4 to section 2-326:
The transactions governed by this section are sales; the persons to
whom the goods are delivered are buyers. This section has no
application to transactions in which goods are delivered to a
person who has neither bought the goods nor contracted to buy
them. See PEB Commentary No. [ ], dated _______. Transactions in which a non-buyer takes delivery of goods for the
purpose of selling them are bailments called consignments. 405

the consigned items.” Goss v. Morgansen’s Ltd. (In re Morgansen’s Ltd.), No.
04-CV-0268, 2005 WL 2370856, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
401 See PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9, at 2–3.
402 Id. at 3 n.19.
403 Id. at 4 n.19.
404 Id. at 3–4.
405 Id. at 6.
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2. Distinguishing Consignments from “Sale or Return”
Transactions
Courts have identified certain traditional indicia to distinguish consignments from “sale or return” transactions.406 One
distinguishing factor in determining whether a transaction is a
sale or return or a consignment is the form of compensation received by the purchaser for subsequent sale of the good.407 One
question is whether the merchant is compensated by commission
or compensated by the difference between the price charged by
the seller and the price set by the merchant in its resale of the
goods.408 In a sale or return, the merchant receives a profit as its
form of compensation, which is the difference between the cost the
merchants pays the seller and the price at which it resells the
goods to a third party.409 In contrast, in a consignment transaction,
the purchaser is compensated by commission.410 In consignment
transactions, the consignor establishes the price at which the consigned goods should be sold by the consignor.411 In United States
v. Nektalov, the federal district court for the Southern District of
New York quoting Gem Diamond Company of New York v. Klein,
stated: “[A] ‘true consignment’ is characterized by the fact that
the consignor retains ownership and sets the sale price; the consignee receives a commission and not the profits of the sale.”412
Other traditional indicia of consignments include an accompanying selling list with the consignment agreement that
references the prices dictated by the consignor instructing the
consignee concerning the amount it must charge third parties
See United States v. Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d 287, 298–99 (S.D.N.Y.
2006); Italian Designer Imp. Outlet, Inc. v. N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 891
N.Y.S.2d 260, 265–66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
407 See Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 299; Italian Designer Imp. Outlet, Inc.,
891 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
408 See Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 299; Italian Designer Imp. Outlet, Inc.,
891 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
409 See Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 299; Italian Designer Imp. Outlet, Inc.,
891 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
410 See Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 299; Italian Designer Imp. Outlet, Inc.,
891 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
411 Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 299.
412 Id. at 299 (quoting Diamond Gem Co. of N.Y. v. Klein, No. 92 Civ. 2503,
1995 WL 72382, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 1995)).
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for the consigned goods.413 Also, custom will play a significant role
in determining whether a transaction is a sale or return or consignment.414 In some commercial relationships, consignments are
the prevalent form of business arrangements between parties.415
Also instructive is whether the buyer bears the risk of loss once
the good is in its possession.416 Transactions are more likely considered sale or returns if the buyer is responsible for maintenance and is required to insure against theft or damage.417
Nektalov is instructive because the court identifies several
attributes that render a transaction a sale, rather than a consignment.418 In that case, diamond owners argued that their delivery
of diamonds to a diamond dealership contained the “traditional
hallmarks of a consignment.”419 The court identified the following
facts as persuading it to conclude that the transaction was a sale,
not a consignment: (1) the time of possession; (2) the means of
compensation; (3) the willingness of the owner to receive something of equal value back from the consignor, even when the delivered item was not sold; (4) the absence of a written consignment
agreement; and (5) the price schedule.420
The court highlighted one of the diamond owner’s testimony
in which he stated that he “left it up to Roman Jewelers [the merchant] to maximize the profit on the diamonds.”421 The other diamond owner admitted that he had never allowed a merchant to
retain possession of his diamonds for more than a year, but in this
case, the diamonds had been in the possession of the merchant
for a much longer period.422 Even though he testified that the arrangement was a consignment, he “did not produce any written
consignment.”423 The court found that the most damaging evidence
413 Italian

Designer Imp. Outlet, Inc., 891 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
Id. But see Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 299 (acknowledging that consignments are frequently utilized in the diamond business, but indicating that “such
a fact, in and of itself, does not dictate a finding that all diamond transactions,
including the instant transactions, are consignments per se”).
415 Italian Designer Imp. Outlet, Inc., 891 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
416 Id. at 267.
417 Id.
418 Nektalov, 440 F. Supp. at 298–99.
419 Id. at 301.
420 See id. at 301–02.
421 Id. at 301.
422 Id. at 302.
423 Id.
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was one diamond owner’s testimony that he would have accepted,
in fact, “would have been entirely satisfied,” had the merchant to
which he delivered the diamonds, delivered to him in return different diamonds provided they had the same value as the ones
he delivered initially to the merchant.424 The court noted that the
owner’s willingness to accept different diamonds than those initially delivered “cut against a consignment relationship, in which
the agent-consignee solely possesses the goods, and the principalconsignor retains a right to repossess the same exact goods prior
to their sale to a third party.”425
CONCLUSION
The Article 9 legal framework for consignments treats in
a much more comprehensive manner the rights of consignors
vis-à-vis competing creditors than did former Article 2; however,
the advent of the new framework has engendered new areas of
uncertainties and perpetuated certain issues that were persistent
under former section 2-326.426 The Permanent Editorial Board proposed commentary and amendments to the UCC address some,
but not all, of the issues of uncertainty surrounding the law of
consignments.427 A complete revision of section 9-102(a)(20) should
be considered that would include moving consignments from the
general definitional provision of Article 9 to its own separate provision, similar to the movement of leases from former section 1201(b)(37) to revised section 1-203. Perhaps, the consignment
provision should be moved to its own separate provision within
Article 9 to include provisions to resolve the persistent uncertainties
surrounding consignment law.
Separate treatment of consignment law in its own revised
provision may be necessary to provide greater clarity and certainty to consignment transactions. The revision could include
provisions that resolve the uncertainties discussed throughout
this Article. The “purpose for sale” issue concerning whether a
424 Id.
425 Id.

at 302.
See generally PEB COMMENTARY DRAFT, supra note 9 (speaking to issues
that were resolved by the new framework, but also highlighting current problematic places for courts).
427 See generally id.
426

478 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:413
sale by a merchant back to the owner is a consignment could be
resolved by including a provision that states, “A consignment means
a transaction, regardless of its form, in which a person delivers
goods to a merchant for the purpose of sale to a third party.” To
resolve the “purpose of sale” issue regarding the delivery of raw
materials, the revision could include a provision that states that
states, “Consigned goods include any finished product generated
from raw materials delivered to a merchant for manufacturing,
processing, commingling, or the like for the purpose of sale to a
third party.” And the revision could include a provision that resolves
the burden of proof issue by providing that, “The party contending
the applicability of section 9-102(a)(20) has the burden of establishing that each element of that section has been satisfied.”
In addition, instead of amending the Official Comments to
address the “sale or return” versus consignment distinction, perhaps the revision could include a provision that states “Those
consignments that do not qualify as Article 9 consignments under
section 9-102(a)(20) are not governed by revised section 2-326 as
“sale or return” transactions. Law other than Articles 2 and 9 of
the UCC applies to such transactions.” Moreover, instead of amending the Official Comments to address issues involving the “generally known” requirement, perhaps the requirement should be
eliminated since Article 9 imposes an affirmative duty on the
consignor to give notice by filing a financing statement.
A separate provision for consignments that provides comprehensive resolution of the vexing issues identified throughout
this Article would bring much-needed clarity, uniformity, and certainty to consignments. And resolving these issues is best achieved
by devising consignment rules consistent with the underlying
principles and policies of Article 9 to ensure predictable and efficient outcomes.

